US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2427


Identifier: 05BAGHDAD2427
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD2427 at
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-06-07 17:26:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ Parliament
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002427 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, IZ, Parliament 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James F. Jeffrey for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
1. (C) Charge was called to a meeting with Deputy PM Rowsch 
Shaways (KDP) on June 7 to discuss the latest developments on 
the political front, with emphasis on Kurdish views.  Shaways 
began by reviewing the state of play with the Kurds:  Barzani 
should be sworn in as President in Irbil on Monday, with 
further steps to stand up the Kurdish Regional Government 
programmed in the next days to complete that process, which 
Shaways termed a major success for both Kurdish parties. 
Following the swearing-in, Barzani plans to come to Baghdad 
probably on June 16.  His primary focus will be on adding 
impetus to the constitutional process.  Following this 
introduction, Shaways brought up his main theme, the need to 
rein in PM Jafari's non-inclusive tendencies. 
2. (C) After reviewing various faults in governance shown by 
Jafari (many of which, frankly, we share), Shaways said that 
the Presidency in particular was unhappy with the lack of 
consultation.  The deputy prime ministers (including Shaways, 
who perhaps is the most left out) were miffed at not being 
given specific portfolios, and the parliament was unhappy 
about not being consulted in advance on the PM's Turkey trip 
and the UNSCR 1546 review. 
3. (C) Consequently, President Talabani will meet with Jafari 
on June 8 to raise these concerns and urge a change in 
Jafari's style.  Shaways handed over a five page Arabic text, 
basically a non-paper, that Talabani would either use or hand 
over, that spelled out all the above concerns in detail.  The 
scathing treatise directly confronts Jafari for acting 
"unilaterally and deviating from the (UIA/Kurdish Alliance) 
political agreement and the TAL," scolding the PM for 
altering the oath of office and marginalizing Article 58. 
The document chides Jafari for the appointment of Leith Kubba 
as ITG spokesman, characterizing him as "chauvinistic and 
anti-Kurdish."  Lamenting the PM's formation of nine 
committees which he directly controls, the document alleges 
that the DPMs have been "transformed into ministers of state 
without work or function."  The Prime Minister is accused of 
"flagrant legal violations" of articles 1, 24 and 25 of the 
TAL, namely by disregarding the separation of powers through 
the appointment of senior ITG officials without the 
consultation of the TNA or the Presidency Council.  Finally, 
PM Jafari is repeatedly charged with discounting the spirit 
of Article 58 of the TAL by "unilaterally and haphazardly" 
ignoring the issue, resulting in a "flagrant violation of the 
TAL."  Talabani warns in closing that this is a matter which 
he "cannot be silent about."  (NOTE: Exact text of Talabani's 
letter to follow in SEPTEL.  END NOTE) 
4. (C) Talabani also plans to call for a steering group of a 
handful of Iraqis--balanced between Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs, 
and Kurds--to do the key work on the constitution ("just like 
we did with the TAL"), and for it then to be approved by the 
parliament.  This initiative and the non-paper text have 
been, according to Shaways, "approved" by Barzani.  Talabani 
has also reviewed the initiative with SCIRI Chief Abdul Aziz 
al-Hakim, who will accompany Talabani to the Jafari meeting. 
When pressed, however, Shaways would not claim explicitly 
that al-Hakim had endorsed the non-paper text. 
5. (C) Shaways clearly wanted at a minimum a green light from 
us on this initiative.  Charge limited himself to saying that 
any effort to streamline government procedures and improve 
coordination and cooperation among government elements was to 
be applauded.  Charge then asked how Shaways thought the 
meeting, which amounted to a confrontation with Jafari, would 
come out.  Here Shaways was optimistic, saying that he 
believed that the President, Hakim, and Jafari would come to 
an agreement on these issues. 
6. (C) COMMENT: There is a lot going on here.  The non-paper 
is written by Talabani, judging from the style.  It is very 
tough and accusatory.  Our own take of Jafari is that if 
confronted so openly, he could well react stubbornly.  We are 
not sure also to what degree al-Hakim is on board on the 
specific charges Talabani makes.  If he has signed up to all 
of this and supports Talabani, Jafari could have a very rough 
meeting.  Nevertheless, there is no one more anti-Jafari than 
Shaways, and he clearly wants to paint the situation with 
Jafari as negatively as possible, and attain maximum U.S. 
support for the "Kurdish" point of view.  END COMMENT. 
7. (C) Charge and DCM will leverage their previously 
scheduled appointment on June 8 with President Talabani to 
follow-up on this issue. 
8. (U) Minimize considered for Iraq REOs. 

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