C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001108
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, NATO, PGOV, AF, GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY: POLITICAL FALL-OUT OVER KUNDUZ AIR
STRIKES CONTAINED -- FOR NOW
REF: A. BERLIN 970
B. BERLIN 837
Classified By: DCM GREG DELAWIE. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Chancellery is confident that Chancellor
Merkel's policy statement to the Bundestag on September 8 has
succeeded -- at least for now -- in settling the domestic
political controversy surrounding the September 4 air strikes
against two hijacked fuel tankers in Kunduz. Ironically, the
Greens called for the special parliamentary session in a
clear attempt to embarrass the government and to make a
campaign issue out of the controversy, but Merkel used it to
her advantage to elicit support for the German deployment in
Afghanistan by all the major parties, save for the Left
Party, which has always opposed the mission. While it had
been expected that internal critics would seize on the
bombing to score political points against the Chancellor and
Defense Minister Jung, the Chancellery, MFA and MOD all
expressed dismay that their closest Allies -- especially the
French -- had made a rush to judgment. Officials at both the
MFA and MOD also expressed disappointment that despite
Germany's excellent track record in avoiding civilian
casualties, COMISAF GEN McChrystal, in their view, quickly
assumed the worst about German actions in this case. The MOD
emphasized that while everything was calm now, this issue
would need to be carefully managed in the coming weeks to
prevent it from becoming a source of anti-Americanism. Both
MFA and Chancellery officials emphasized that the joint
German-UK-France proposal for an international conference on
Afghanistan was not made in reaction to the Kunduz event and
is not a cover for trying to secure a date certain for
withdrawal. END SUMMARY.
CHANCELLOR'S STATEMENT
2. (C) In her policy statement to the Bundestag on September
8, Chancellor Merkel appealed to ISAF allies as well as
critics at home to reserve judgment regarding the September 4
decision by the German PRT commander in Kunduz to call in air
strikes against two fuel tankers that had been hijacked by
insurgents. At the same time, she promised a full inquiry
into the matter and gave assurances that Germany took the
issue of collateral damage very seriously. "Even the death
of one innocent person is one too many," she stressed. In
retreating from the initial stand taken by Defense Minister
Jung -- who had insisted that only insurgents had been killed
in the nighttime attack -- she succeeded in deflating some of
the early indignation over the incident, since Jung's
statements seemed to defy clear evidence to the contrary.
All the major parties, with the exception of the Left Party,
which opposes all Bundeswehr deployments, used the special
Bundestag session to reaffirm their support for the
Afghanistan mission and to reject calls for withdrawal.
CHANCELLERY: "ASTONISHED" AT ALLIES' REACTION
3. (C) Chancellery Director Ludger Siemes told the Political
Minister-Counselor right after the Chancellor's remarks that
he thought she had succeeded in taking this issue "off the
top of the political agenda" and keeping it from spiraling
into a major campaign issue in the run-up to the September 27
Bundestag election. Siemes said that the government would
now wait for the results of the various investigations and
would take appropriate action based on what was found. While
it had been expected that internal critics would seize on the
event to score political points against the Chancellor and
Defense Minister Jung, Siemes said he had been "astonished"
at the criticism leveled by their fellow Allies, most notably
French FM Kouchner, who had rushed to the microphones to
condemn the strike as a "big mistake."
MOD: JUNG'S INITIAL APPROACH WAS WRONG
4. (C) MOD Planning Staff Director Ulrich Schlie admitted to
the DCM that it had been a mistake for the Bundeswehr and
Defense Minister Jung to rule out at the start the
possibility of civilian casualties, noting that this had only
stoked the flames of controversy. Like Siemes, however, he
could only shake his head over the rush to judgment by Allies
who should know better than to make public statements on
initial reports. Schlie indicated that the MOD's ability to
manage the domestic political fallout from the incident had
been greatly complicated by COMISAF GEN McChrystal's decision
BERLIN 00001108 002 OF 003
to have an embedded Washington Post journalist as part of his
investigatory team that accompanied him to Kunduz on
September 5. It produced an outcry among the Bundestag
Defense Committee when it turned out that the resulting
Washington Post story had much more detail about the incident
and events leading up to it than what the MOD had provided to
parliamentarians. Schlie agreed that Merkel's Bundestag
statement, which was broadcast nationwide and widely covered
in the press, had successfully staunched the political wound
caused by the Kunduz incident, but said this issue would need
to be carefully managed in the coming weeks to prevent it
from becoming a source of anti-Americanism.
MFA: CONCERNED ABOUT LACK OF SOLIDARITY
5. (C) MFA ISAF Action Officer Lukas Wasielewski made the
same point to PolOff, noting that Germans had been taken
aback at what they saw as implied U.S. criticism and a lack
of solidarity and support for the German PRT commander. He
said that, given Germany's excellent track record in avoiding
civilian casualties, GEN McChrystal had seemed too quick in
assuming the worst about German actions in this case. Like
the Chancellery and MOD, he said it was important to "remove
the emotion from this topic" and handle it in a calm and
objective way.
PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: PREDATING KUNDUZ
6. (C) Wasielewski also emphasized that Merkel's joint
initiative with French President Sarkozy and British PM Brown
to send a letter to UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon,
proposing an international conference on Afghanistan by the
end of the year, had little to do with the Kunduz incident.
He said the conference idea has been in gestation for a
while. Wasielewski also denied that the conference was an
effort to justify an early withdrawal of German troops from
Afghanistan. Siemes at the Chancellery confirmed this,
noting that the Kunduz incident had only brought a
long-standing idea to the fore, which was finalized during
the September 6 visit to Berlin by PM Brown. Siemes said the
motivation for the conference was to set benchmarks for the
new Afghan government and to provide a new framework for
international engagement in Afghanistan, replacing the London
Compact, which expires next year. The idea of the conference
was to galvanize the international community -- as well as
the Afghans -- to re-double their efforts to achieve success
as quickly as possible, thereby enabling Afghan security
forces and authorities to assume responsibility for their own
country. The Germans are not proposing that a date certain
be set for withdrawal, which both the Chancellor and FM
Steinmeier have publicly reiterated would be
counterproductive.
7. (C) Schlie from MOD confirmed that the German preference
is to hold the conference this fall, before the newly elected
Bundestag considers renewing the parliamentary mandate for
the ISAF deployment in December. He noted that a new
Afghanistan Compact would make it easier for the new German
government to justify additional contributions to the ISAF
operation and the overall Afghanistan mission. He
acknowledged, on the other hand, that there was not much time
to organize such a major conference before the end of the
year, especially with the Afghan election still long from
being decided. Siemes at the Chancellery also indicated
that, given the need to wait until the new Afghan government
was in place, it would be fine if the date of the conference
slipped into the new year. Like other German officials in
recent weeks, Schlie said that the new German government
would be prepared, in all likelihood, to make significant
additional contributions to the international effort in
Afghanistan, both in the military and civilian spheres.
However, any significant military increases (there is
speculation about an increase in the troop ceiling from the
current 4,500 to 6,500) would need to be part of a broader
strategic context involving additional contributions on the
civilian side as well.
COMMENT
8. (C) With only three weeks before German national
elections, it goes without saying that the Kunduz incident
comes at a very politically sensitive time. Fortunately, the
Chancellor, in her policy statement to the Bundestag, has
been able to limit the damage to the delicate political
BERLIN 00001108 003 OF 003
consensus here in favor of the Afghanistan deployment. She
has successfully rallied all the main political parties in
rejecting calls for withdrawal. The hope is that the Allies
and others will refrain from any further premature judgments
or speculation about what happened in Kunduz, which could be
exploited by the Left Party and other Afghanistan opponents
for electoral advantage.
9. (C) The Kunduz incident ironically also comes at a time
when the views of the United States and Germany regarding the
approach to Afghanistan have never been closer. All of our
interlocutors warmly welcome COMISAF's new counterinsurgency
guidance, which emphasizes protecting the Afghan population
over chasing down and killing insurgents. They view the new
U.S. emphasis on avoiding civilian casualties as moving
toward a position they have long advocated. At the same
time, they now acknowledge that their own forces, in view of
the deteriorating security situation in the north, have to be
more active in providing security and being willing to use
force as appropriate. Their new rules of engagement (ref A)
have gone a long way in this regard. Along similar lines,
the old debate between the U.S. and Germany on the best way
to train Afghan police -- i.e., the U.S. supposedly stressing
speed and quantity versus the Germans stressing quality -- is
over. The Germans have completely signed up to the U.S.
focused district development (FDD) police training program
and are moving toward to taking responsibility for FDD
throughout the north (ref B).
10. (C) It is this convergence of views, and their belief
that they are one of our most reliable Allies in Afghanistan,
that makes the Germans so sensitive to any perceived U.S.
criticism of their actions. They feel that their careful and
dependable management of the north -- while acknowledging the
growing problems with the insurgency there -- have earned
them the benefit of the doubt when incidents like the fuel
tanker bombing in Kunduz occur. As we go forward with our
plans to deploy some 300 U.S. Special Forces in Mazar-e
Sharif to assist the Germans in meeting the growing
insurgency threat, we will want to be careful not to give the
impression that we do not have faith in the Germans to do
what is necessary to continue to secure the north as they
have been for almost six years. While the Germans have been
consistently reluctant about deploying combat troops outside
the north, they have been equally consistent in ensuring that
all the troop and equipment needs in the north -- including
OMLTs for the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) --
are fulfilled. It is our interest for the Germans to
continue to feel "ownership" of this part of the country.
Murphy
| C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001108
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, NATO, PGOV, AF, GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY: POLITICAL FALL-OUT OVER KUNDUZ AIR
STRIKES CONTAINED -- FOR NOW
REF: A. BERLIN 970
B. BERLIN 837
Classified By: DCM GREG DELAWIE. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Chancellery is confident that Chancellor
Merkel's policy statement to the Bundestag on September 8 has
succeeded -- at least for now -- in settling the domestic
political controversy surrounding the September 4 air strikes
against two hijacked fuel tankers in Kunduz. Ironically, the
Greens called for the special parliamentary session in a
clear attempt to embarrass the government and to make a
campaign issue out of the controversy, but Merkel used it to
her advantage to elicit support for the German deployment in
Afghanistan by all the major parties, save for the Left
Party, which has always opposed the mission. While it had
been expected that internal critics would seize on the
bombing to score political points against the Chancellor and
Defense Minister Jung, the Chancellery, MFA and MOD all
expressed dismay that their closest Allies -- especially the
French -- had made a rush to judgment. Officials at both the
MFA and MOD also expressed disappointment that despite
Germany's excellent track record in avoiding civilian
casualties, COMISAF GEN McChrystal, in their view, quickly
assumed the worst about German actions in this case. The MOD
emphasized that while everything was calm now, this issue
would need to be carefully managed in the coming weeks to
prevent it from becoming a source of anti-Americanism. Both
MFA and Chancellery officials emphasized that the joint
German-UK-France proposal for an international conference on
Afghanistan was not made in reaction to the Kunduz event and
is not a cover for trying to secure a date certain for
withdrawal. END SUMMARY.
Chancellor's statement
2. (C) In her policy statement to the Bundestag on September
8, Chancellor Merkel appealed to ISAF allies as well as
critics at home to reserve judgment regarding the September 4
decision by the German PRT commander in Kunduz to call in air
strikes against two fuel tankers that had been hijacked by
insurgents. At the same time, she promised a full inquiry
into the matter and gave assurances that Germany took the
issue of collateral damage very seriously. "Even the death
of one innocent person is one too many," she stressed. In
retreating from the initial stand taken by Defense Minister
Jung -- who had insisted that only insurgents had been killed
in the nighttime attack -- she succeeded in deflating some of
the early indignation over the incident, since Jung's
statements seemed to defy clear evidence to the contrary.
All the major parties, with the exception of the Left Party,
which opposes all Bundeswehr deployments, used the special
Bundestag session to reaffirm their support for the
Afghanistan mission and to reject calls for withdrawal.
Chancellery: "astonished" at allies' reaction
3. xxxxxxxxxxxx
Mod: jung's initial approach was wrong
4. xxxxxxxxxxxx
5. xxxxxxxxxxxx
6. xxxxxxxxxxxx
7. xxxxxxxxxxxx
Comment
8. (C) With only three weeks before German national
elections, it goes without saying that the Kunduz incident
comes at a very politically sensitive time. Fortunately, the
Chancellor, in her policy statement to the Bundestag, has
been able to limit the damage to the delicate political
Berlin 00001108 003 of 003
consensus here in favor of the Afghanistan deployment. She
has successfully rallied all the main political parties in
rejecting calls for withdrawal. The hope is that the Allies
and others will refrain from any further premature judgments
or speculation about what happened in Kunduz, which could be
exploited by the Left Party and other Afghanistan opponents
for electoral advantage.
9. (C) The Kunduz incident ironically also comes at a time
when the views of the United States and Germany regarding the
approach to Afghanistan have never been closer. All of our
interlocutors warmly welcome COMISAF's new counterinsurgency
guidance, which emphasizes protecting the Afghan population
over chasing down and killing insurgents. They view the new
U.S. emphasis on avoiding civilian casualties as moving
toward a position they have long advocated. At the same
time, they now acknowledge that their own forces, in view of
the deteriorating security situation in the north, have to be
more active in providing security and being willing to use
force as appropriate. Their new rules of engagement (ref A)
have gone a long way in this regard. Along similar lines,
the old debate between the U.S. and Germany on the best way
to train Afghan police -- i.e., the U.S. supposedly stressing
speed and quantity versus the Germans stressing quality -- is
over. The Germans have completely signed up to the U.S.
focused district development (FDD) police training program
and are moving toward to taking responsibility for FDD
throughout the north (ref B).
10. (C) It is this convergence of views, and their belief
that they are one of our most reliable Allies in Afghanistan,
that makes the Germans so sensitive to any perceived U.S.
criticism of their actions. They feel that their careful and
dependable management of the north -- while acknowledging the
growing problems with the insurgency there -- have earned
them the benefit of the doubt when incidents like the fuel
tanker bombing in Kunduz occur. As we go forward with our
plans to deploy some 300 U.S. Special Forces in Mazar-e
Sharif to assist the Germans in meeting the growing
insurgency threat, we will want to be careful not to give the
impression that we do not have faith in the Germans to do
what is necessary to continue to secure the north as they
have been for almost six years. While the Germans have been
consistently reluctant about deploying combat troops outside
the north, they have been equally consistent in ensuring that
all the troop and equipment needs in the north -- including
OMLTs for the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) --
are fulfilled. It is our interest for the Germans to
continue to feel "ownership" of this part of the country.
Murphy
|