C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 00028
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PINS IZ
SUBJECT: CHRISTIANS IN MOSUL
1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. ON DECEMBER 29 AMBASSADOR CALLED ON SENIOR
CHRISTIAN CLERIC RESIDENT IN MOSUL, CHALDEAN
ARCHBISHOP GARMO (STRICTLY PROTECT),
FOR DISCUSSION OF CHRISTIAN CONDITIONS IN
3. GARMO TOLD US THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT ANY
FURTHER DISTURBING OF CHRISTIAN VILLAGES. AS
PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, WHAT RELOCATION THERE HAS BEEN
HAS BEEN OVER FOR WEEKS. THE CHRISTIAN (NOT JUST
CHALDEAN) VILLAGES TO THE NORTH OF MOSUL IN THE
AREA AROUND TELL KAYF ARE EXISTING NORMALLY.
(A SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO SEVERAL OF THOSE VILLAGES
CONFIRMED THAT THIS IS THE CASE.)
4. THE TWO CHIEF ISSUES ON THE PATRIARCH'S
MIND, GARMO SAID, ARE THE CHRISTIAN DESIRE TO
OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR CHRISTIAN TEACHING IN THE
SCHOOLS, (THIS IS ALLOWED ONLY IF THE STUDENT
BODY LS 51& CHRISTIAN), AND THE WISH FOR SOME
KIND OF NEWSLETTER.
5. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PATRIARCH HAS NOT BEEN ABLE
TO OBTAIN AN APPOINTMENT WITH SADDAM FOR SOME
TIME. WHILE THE "UNPRECEDENTED" CHRISTMAS
GREETINGS FROM SADDAM TO THE PATRIARCH ON
CHRISTMAS EVE HAD RAISED HOPES, THEY WERE DASHED
WHEN SADDAM CONTINUED TO PUT OFF THE PATRIARCH,
BUT DID RECEIVE THE CHALDEAN ARCHBISHOP
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TINY CHALDEAN LEBANESE
6. LOCALLY, THE GOVERNOR IS UNFAILINGLY
PLEASANT, BUT WILL TAKE NO INITIATIVE. THE
ARCHBISHOP, THEREFORE, RELIES ON THE HEAD OF
SECURITY FOR MOSUL, A NEW APPOINTEE
WHO HAS SO FAR PROVED HELPFUL AND COMPASSIONATE.
BUT THIS IS A WEAK REED, AND THE CHURCH WOULD
NATURALLY PREFER TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE TOP. IN
THE CASE OF SOME SERIOUS PROBLEM
THE CHRISTIANS STILL REGARD THEIR ACE IN THE
HOLE TO BE ADNAN KHAIRALLAH'S FATHER,
WHO IS ACCESSIBLE AND HAS BEEN HELPFUL DURING
DIFFICULT TIMES IN THE PAST.
7. IN VISITING MONASTERIES AND VILLAGES NORTHEAST
AND SOUTHEAST OF MOSUL, EMBASSY OFFICIALS
DID SEE MONEY BEING SPENT BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR
THE CHRISTIANS. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SPANKING
NEW VILLAGES, MARKED "SADDAM MODEL VILLAGE,"
AND THE 4TH CENTURY MONASTERY AT MAR BAHNAM
HAS RECEIVED AN EXPENSIVE FACELIFTING INSIDE
AND OUTSIDE, INCLUDING EXPENSIVE NEW MARBLE FACING.
S e c r e t state 068250
E.o. 12958: decl: 07/01/2034
Tags: mtcre, parm, prel, ettc, mnuc, tspa, ir, gm, ch
Subject: german test chamber sold by chinese subsidiary to
iran's dio (s)
Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS
1.4 (b), (c), and (d).
1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Berlin please see paragraph 3.
2. (S) Background and Objectives: The United States has information indicating that the Chinese subsidiaryof the German firm xxxxxxxxxxxx test chamber to Iran's Defense IndustriesOrganization (DIO), an entity sanctioned under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737. We also understand that as of mid-May 2009, Chinese national and known proliferator xxxxxxxxxxxx was working to arrange training on the test chamber for DIO representatives - likely on the premises of xxxxxxxxxxxx China. Although this particular test chamber is not controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it is suitable for subjecting missile components and systems to the harsh environmental conditions experienced by missiles during launch, flight, and reentry. We want to ask German officials to investigate this information and ensure that xxxxxxxxxxxx is taking all measures necessary to prevent unauthorized retransfers of its goods by foreign-based subsidiaries - especially to
entities of proliferation concern.
3. (U) Action Request: Request Embassy Berlin approach appropriate German government officials to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 4 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.
4. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:
-- We would like to raise with you a matter of proliferation concern and request your government's assistance in investigating this activity.
-- The United States has information indicating that xxxxxxxxxxxx China (the Chinese subsidiary of xxxxxxxxxxxx chamber to Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO).
-- This test chamber is not controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the Australia Group (AG), but is suitable for subjecting ballistic missile components and their weapons payloads to the harsh environmental conditions experienced during the launch, flight and reentry of ballistic missiles.
-- DIO, which is part of Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), is an entity sanctioned under United Nations Security Council
-- We also understand that as of mid-May 2009, Chinese national xxxxxxxxxxxx was working with DIO to arrange training on the xxxxxxxxxxxx. This training
will likely be provided at the premises of xxxxxxxxxxxx China.
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx may also have played a role in the sale of the test chamber to DIO.
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx is a known proliferator associated with several Chinese entities, including the xxxxxxxxxxxx Company and xxxxxxxxxxxx Company.
-- His activities have been the subject of discussion during the Australia Group Information Exchange.
-- In addition, xxxxxxxxxxxx has been sanctioned by the U.S. on seven separate occasions for his chemical weapons proliferation-related activities, and is currently subject to sanctions which are in place pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act.
-- We urge you to investigate this activity and ensure that xxxxxxxxxxxx is taking all necessary measures to prevent unauthorized retransfers of its goods by foreign-based subsidiaries - especially to entities of proliferation concern.
-- We appreciate Germany's cooperation on nonproliferation matters and look forward to hearing of any actions your government takes in response to this
End talking points/nonpaper.
5. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann with any questions or follow-up issues related to this case (202-647-1430 -firstname.lastname@example.org) and slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR, EUR/PRA and eur/ce.
6. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.