US embassy cable - 04BRASILIA1291

BRAZIL: BILATERAL POL-MIL TALKS

Identifier: 04BRASILIA1291
Wikileaks: View 04BRASILIA1291 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Brasilia
Created: 2004-05-27 12:58:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MARR MASS MCAP PREL BR POL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRASILIA 001291 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2009 
TAGS: MARR, MASS, MCAP, PREL, BR, POL-MIL Issues 
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: BILATERAL POL-MIL TALKS 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Richard Virden, Reasons 
1.4 (b) 
& (d) 
 
1.   (C)  Summary and Introduction:  Annual U.S.-Brazil 
Political-Military consultations, held in Brasilia, May 14, 
reflected general accord on the health of the bilateral 
pol-mil relationship but identified areas where collaboration 
and coordination remained thin.  USdel head P/M Assistant 
Secretary Lincoln Bloomfield Jr. offered to help close the 
 
SIPDIS 
gap on outstanding issues, particularly where specific 
written agreement that would facilitate expanded cooperation 
was lacking.  While the A/S acknowledged that ties between 
the two militaries were strong, such agreements, he said, 
would enhance them more. Brazilian officials, led by Foreign 
Ministry (MRE) Director General for North and Central America 
and the Caribbean Ambassador Washington Pereira, welcomed 
U.S. clarification on such matters as Article 98, a proposed 
Defense Cooperation Agreement, GSOMIA, and ACSA, but conceded 
little in bringing any negotiated agreement closer to 
closure.  Looking at the regional situation, the Brazilian 
side highlighted bilateral efforts with Colombia, Venezuela 
and Bolivia, but stopped short of implying a more active 
political engagement with Colombia (unless specifically 
requested from the GoC.)  Focusing on its upcoming 
peacekeeping mission to Haiti, the GOB asked that the USG 
assist that country's post-Aristide political leadership to 
reach out to pro-Aristide elements and Caricom.  Regarding 
Brazil's F-X jet fighter competition, A/S Bloomfield made an 
indirect pitch for the Lockheed-Martin F-16 by noting 
continued AMRAAM availability for the U.S. package.  The F-X 
decision process, according to the Ministry of Defense, now 
rests with the Presidency. The GOB side expressed reluctance 
for any significant change to the mission of regional 
security instruments such as the InterAmerican Defense Board 
and the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security.    End Summary 
 
 
DCA & SOFA 
---------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  In order to achieve the unmet potential in the 
current mil-mil relationship, A/S Bloomfield explained how a 
defense cooperation framework agreement (DCA) would be a very 
practical tool for facilitating cooperation in several 
defense areas such as exchanges, training, and joint 
exercises.  He shared with the GOB a non-paper explaining the 
purpose of a DCA as well as a SOFA, identifying the elements 
contained in the latter.  The U.S. side stated that a SOFA 
was necessary for entry into a DCA.  The A/S offered to send 
USG experts to explain both types of agreements and, in so 
doing, to clarify the differences between the two. 
Ambassador Pereira was open to the possibility of a DCA but 
remained skeptical that the Brazilian Congress would approve 
a SOFA because of Constitutional concerns.  However, he 
acknowledged that since the SOFA applied only to discrete 
groups of U.S. servicemen, the issue could still be left open 
for internal GOB review.  Ministry of Defense (MOD) Director 
for International Affairs Air Force General Carlos Velloso 
also welcomed the Assistant Secretary,s suggestion for 
exploratory talks.  Velloso noted that discussion of a SOFA 
would go beyond the purview of just the Defense and Foreign 
Affairs Ministries, and include the Ministry of Justice among 
others; the A/S replied the same holds true for the U.S. 
side, insofar as Brazil wants to discuss reciprocal 
treatment. 
 
GSOMIA 
------ 
 
3.  (SBU)  General Velloso indicated that the Ministry of 
Defense had already begun review of the draft General 
Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) 
facilitating the exchange of classified military information. 
 While the MOD wanted an agreement, Velloso stated that a 
number of "restrictions and caveats" have been voiced within 
the Ministry about "illegal" USG requirements (Note: Velloso 
subsequently downplayed, then dismissed, the notion of 
illegal requirements. End note).  As a result, the review 
process within the Ministry had ground to a halt.  He 
promised the MOD would continue to review the agreement to 
see what is feasible.  OSD Senior Country Director for Brazil 
Luiz Sanchez replied that over 60 countries, including five 
in the Western Hemisphere, had already signed GSOMIAs with 
the U.S.  In every case, no such "legal" concerns had been 
voiced by the parties. Sanchez said the USG would appreciate 
Brazil,s specific concerns. He also offered to arrange a 
GSOMIA orientation visit to the U.S. as a confidence building 
measure to alleviate MOD concerns, a proposal welcomed by the 
MOD. 
 
ACSA 
---- 
 
4.  (SBU)  General Velloso recognized the importance of 
signing an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) 
in support of Brazil's upcoming PKO mission to Haiti. 
However, he pointed to several legislative hurdles that had 
to be addressed before Brazil could sign it.  For example, 
Brazilian Law 8666, he said, did not allow for "cross 
servicing."  According to Velloso, several passages within 
the ACSA may need to be deleted or modified.  Again, Sanchez 
noted that 47 nations already have ACSAs in place, including 
six in South America.  Sanchez reiterated the rationale for 
an ACSA and asked whether the MOD understood its routine, 
non-binding nature.  Again, the U.S. side requested Brazil,s 
specific concerns and suggestions. 
 
Article 98 
---------- 
 
5.  (U)  A/S Bloomfield explained that while there is 
profound feeling behind the USG rhetoric, U.S. policy sought 
neither to undermine the ICC/Rome Statute nor to be punitive. 
Moreover, the USG, he pointed out, is not looking to harm its 
military assistance programs, which serve our interests as 
well.  The American Servicemen's Protection Act, however, was 
a clear effort to use assistance as leverage to dissuade 
countries from joining the Rome Statute, and the USG would 
enforce the law.  Noting that 89 Article 98 agreements had 
already been concluded (over half with countries that have at 
least signed the Rome Statute), Bloomfield said the USG is 
comporting with the Rome Statute by following the Article 98 
procedure.  While the USG recognizes Brazil,s strong 
advocacy for accountability and responsibility, the A/S made 
clear we do not recognize the ICC's jurisdiction over U.S. 
citizens. Moreover, he emphasized, the threat to U.S. 
citizens of politicized prosecution has been shown to be a 
real world phenomenon. 
 
6.  (C)  MRE United Nations Division Deputy Chief Achiles 
Zaluar responded that the MRE was gratified the Bush 
administration wanted to avoid a confrontation over Article 
98.  The ICC, Zaluar noted, enjoys considerable public 
support in Brazil, and the GoB believes the Court is an 
important international institution.  Brazil did not want to 
give the impression international law automatically did not 
apply to some countries.  Moreover, Zaluar said, the U.S. 
Article 98 model agreement appeared to exempt all U.S. 
nationals and not just sent persons.  "Things would be 
different if we were talking only about USG officials and 
soldiers," he pointed out, "but a blanket condition for all 
U.S. citizens could be detrimental if (this policy was) 
applied by all countries to the ICC."  Brazil,s extradition 
stance, he argued, was similar to the EU,s and the GoB could 
offer "additional guarantees" if that would alleviate USG 
concerns.  He stated that Brazil would extradite to the 
United States before the ICC and urged the USG in its 
dealings with Brazil to think "out-of-the-box." Ambassador 
Pereira proposed the GoB continue to study the issue with the 
clarifications that the UGS provided. 
 
Intelligence Sharing /"3 1" TBA Cooperation 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  MRE Illicit Transitional Crime Division Chief Marcos 
Pinta Gama shared USG optimism about bilateral intelligence 
and law enforcement cooperation, pointing out that Brazilian 
agencies benefit greatly from cooperation with counterpart 
USG agencies.  He cited extensive information exchange on 
crime, drugs and anti-terrorism and specifically praised the 
bilateral, Embassy-led Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWG), 
established in 2003.  Pinta Gama did refer to a State 
Department website citing "financial support" from the TBA 
for terrorist groups and asked that such a determination be 
"better established."  He described the "3 1" mechanism as 
instrumental in showing the reality in the TBA and the 
challenges faced there.  Pinta Gama also suggested that Chile 
and Uruguay be added to the "3 1" Group.  MRE's crime chief 
felt that additional bilateral cooperation and more fluid 
threat information exchange could be achieved between 
Brazilian civil aviation authorities and the TSA, 
particularly in the absence of armed air marshals in Brazil. 
 
Regional Challenges 
------------------- 
 
8.   (C)  MRE South America Division Chief Rubem Barbosa 
provided an overview of the state of Brazil,s neighbors, and 
Pinta Gama reviewed Brazil,s border monitoring coordination 
efforts with its Andean neighbors. Regarding Colombia, the 
GoB remained concerned with possible spillover effects.  To 
improve tactical cooperation, Presidents Uribe and Lula 
established a bilateral working group to exploit the 
information gleaned from SIVAM, now completely operational. 
Pinta Gama praised the work of the Regional Intelligence 
Center in Tabatinga which monitors the flow of drugs along 
the Colombian border.  Brazil, Barbosa stated, perceived 
significant political progress under Uribe and remained 
"moderately optimistic" about that country's prospects.  He 
reiterated Brazil,s offer to host a meeting between the UN 
and the insurgents, if the GoC concurred.  A/S Bloomfield 
asked how Brazil could play an even more constructive role in 
Colombia.  Barbosa emphasized the GoB would not "impose its 
views" on the Colombian people.  Brazil would lend more 
active participation, he said, if it were welcomed by the 
Colombians themselves.  Brazil wanted a clear signal or 
indication for its broader involvement and would only act if 
Bogota specifically requested its assistance. 
 
9.  (C)  Brazil shares its longest and most porous border 
with Bolivia. Ambassador Pereira said the GoB viewed with 
"grave concern" the "seismic changes" occurring in Bolivia, 
including the disturbing convergence of an energized 
indigenous movement with the drug problem. Pereira 
underscored the Brazil's unshaken support for President Mesa 
and President Lula,s efforts to keep Morales on a democratic 
path. Brazil, he said, was also doing everything it could to 
prevent Bolivia,s economic collapse and warned that 
"moderation" had to continue.  Barbosa explained that Brazil 
continued to work with Venezuela on a wide range of issues 
including trafficking-in-persons and cross border drug 
trafficking.  However, Venezuela must respect democratic 
principles and move towards a democratic solution -- a stance 
the Lula administration continued to demand of Chavez. 
Barbosa opined that Lula,s close ties with Chavez helps to 
"moderate" the Venezuelan leader. 
 
PKO/HAITI 
--------- 
 
10.  (C)  Zaluar announced that the bill authorizing Brazil's 
participation in the Haiti peacekeeping operation had just 
passed the Chamber of Deputies, adding that President Lula 
personally had been involved in the process.  (Note: The bill 
passed the Senate on May 19. End note)  Brazil, he explained, 
wanted Haiti,s underlying social and development issues to 
be addressed during this UN operation, and the international 
community, and especially the U.S., should provide generous 
financial support.  The MRE believed that Haitians had turned 
to drug trafficking only when there was no other viable 
economic alternative after international assistance was cut 
off.  Pointing to continued repercussions from President 
Aristide's departure from power, Zaluar urged the U.S. to 
press Haiti's current leadership to reach out to Caricom and 
the pro-Aristide forces.  Caricom support, he felt, was vital 
to a political solution and so far, the new leaders seemed 
not to have a good understanding of the regional context of 
the Haiti situation.  A/S Bloomfield expressed USG 
appreciation for Brazil's decision to lead in this important 
hemispheric operation, and the United States understood the 
need for the country's economic and social development.  He 
said he would carry the message regarding the behavior 
towards pro-Aristide elements and Caricom back to Washington. 
 
Defense Modernization Programs 
------------------------------ 
 
11.  (SBU)  One of Brazil's most important military 
modernization efforts is the new generation F-X fighter 
program.  General Velloso indicated that the long-running F-X 
competition process had progressed from the Air Force through 
the MOD to the Presidency where a decision on the selection 
of the F-X had not yet been made.  The Ministry of Defense 
remained closely engaged with the Presidency, the General 
assured, and its technical imput on the fighter options was 
being weighed carefully.  A/S Bloomfield emphasized that the 
USAF's principal interest is not commercial but rather to 
sustain a close, long-term relationship with the Brazilian 
Air Force, which is held in high regard among the US 
military.  Regarding authorization to release the AMRAAM 
missile as a part of the U.S. F-16 package, the USG had 
confronted and overcome old attitudes in the U.S. Congress 
because "the partnership with Brazil was a greater interest 
even than our regional proliferation concerns."  Amazon 
Surveillance System (SIVAM) Commission Vice President Air 
Force General Alvaro Pinheiro stated that with the opening of 
the Manaus command center, SIVAM was "completely 
operational."  He cited continuing spare parts issues with 
Raytheon, although he conceded there were no more "technical 
problems."  Southcom J-5 Brazil Desk Officer LTC Sam Prugh 
indicated that the USG supported greater regional sharing of 
radar data to develop a complete, seamless picture that would 
better protect Brazil's borders. 
 
Special Conference on Hemispheric Security 
------------------------------------------ 
 
12. (SBU) MRE OAS Division Chief Nelson Tabajara praised the 
successful outcome of the Special Conference, including the 
Declaration on Security in the Americas (DSA).  He described 
the DSA as evidence of the historical evolution of 
hemispheric security issues within the OAS. To reach 
consensus on such a significant document, a lengthy 
preparatory process was indeed necessary.  In Brazil,s 
opinion, the DSA correctly emphasizes threats beyond simply 
traditional territorial confrontations.  Tabajara concluded 
by asserting that the Declaration serves as both a guide and 
a starting point because future work, including perhaps 
additional conferences, will be needed to bolster hemispheric 
security.  Eli Sugarman from the Office of Regional and 
Strategic Security, Bureau of Arms Control, echoed Brazil,s 
position and emphasized the need to move forward with 
implementation of the DSA.  Sugarman also agreed that 
continued consultations are needed to discuss concrete ways 
to implement the more action oriented provisions of the DSA. 
 
Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
13. (SBU)   Sugarman stated that one of the most significant 
outcomes of the Special Conference on Security was the 
creation of a permanent OAS "Forum for Confidence and 
Security Building" to consider new measures and review 
implementation of past ones.  The U.S. hopes to use this 
Forum to consider a "new generation" of CSBMs to address 
emerging transnational threats of the 21st century.  Tabajara 
agreed that the pursuit of a new generation of non-military 
measures is important.  Since original measures have 
succeeded in considerably lowering mistrust, he felt a new 
generation of measures could continue this momentum and 
further promote stability and military transparency in the 
hemisphere. 
 
OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS), 
    General Assembly Resolutions 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
14.   (C)   Tabajara affirmed that Brazil was satisfied with 
the work of the CHS, and he highlighted Brazil,s recent 
draft resolution on combating extreme poverty as a security 
concern for Brazil and others.  Sugarman stressed the need 
for a more effective CHS Chair next year to ensure that the 
CHS is able to fulfill its numerous mandates, including those 
related to Special Conference follow-up.  The process of 
introducing resolutions also ought to be reconsidered, he 
added. For example, although the U.S. supports Brazil's 
resolution on extreme poverty, we were caught by surprise 
when it was introduced at the last minute without prior 
consultation.  Sugarman,s reference to a U.S.-drafted 
resolution on Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) 
surprised the Brazilians because they were unaware that such 
a draft resolution was being considered.  Sugarman explained 
that further consultations were needed before the draft would 
be formally introduced. He concluded by suggesting a series 
of regular (quarterly) consultations between the U.S. and 
Brazilian OAS delegations to ensure better coordination on 
hemispheric security issues. 
 
Inter-American Defense Board Modernization 
------------------------------------------ 
 
15.  (SBU)   The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), A/S 
Bloomfield stated, should be part of a new array of effective 
and relevant regional security institutions, and the U.S. 
favors a range of proposals to modernize it.  The U.S. 
military, he noted, is increasingly called to perform 
nontraditional tasks, such as providing advice to outgunned 
police forces faced with heavily-armed organized crime 
elements. Yet, the OAS lacked the expertise to assist in 
large measure because it cannot call upon the IADB for help. 
The USG recognizes, however, that making changes to the IADB 
is a consensus matter for its members.  Among the proposed 
reforms, the A/S pointed to a proposal to divide the Board 
into subunits for hemispheric security responsibilities and 
for traditional defense. 
 
16.  (SBU) MRE OAS Division Chief Nelson Tabajara responded 
that while the GoB also supports the IADB, it is skeptical 
about the benefits of reforming the Board.  While sympathetic 
to USG concerns, the GoB, believes the IADB serves a unique 
role in the region by providing a forum to discuss 
traditional military tasks and its mission should not be 
"diluted."  New threats where there are no single paradigms 
or solutions, should be accommodated through "new mechanisms 
and assets...on a case by case basis" depending upon the 
threat, Tabajara explained.  The A/S acknowledged that the 
two countries differ on their perceptions how to utilize the 
IADB.   MOD Vice-Admiral Murillo Barbosa acknowledged the 
increase in non-traditional tasks undertaken by the Brazilian 
military, including Amazon development, counterdrug 
operations, and assistance to the Rio de Janeiro police. 
However, he seconded Tabajara,s point about preserving the 
IADB as a forum for defense issues focusing on "traditional" 
threats. 
 
Comment 
------- 
17.  (C)  While the upcoming Haiti PKO was the principal 
issue on the minds of Brazilian interlocutors during the 
talks, within the Brazilian delegation there appeared to be a 
disconnect between the PKO mission and the need for various 
agreements, such as a GSOMIA and an ACSA, to be in place to 
assure the mission's effectiveness and success. We believe 
our message may have sunk in.  Subsequently, we have learned 
that the MRE has approached various diplomatic missions in 
Brasilia, inquiring about their governments' respective 
agreements with us. As Brazilian peacekeepers arrive in 
Haiti, we may see movement on these agreements.  Finally, 
while the Brazilians no doubt came away with a better 
understanding of issues of major importance to us, such as 
Article 98, they conceded little except their stated 
intention to continue reviewing these topics. 
 
18.  (U)  Assistant Secretary Bloomfield has cleared this 
message. 
 
Hrinak 

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