US embassy cable - 04RANGOON647

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BURMESE REGIME'S STRATEGIC VIEWS OF U.S. AND CHINA

Identifier: 04RANGOON647
Wikileaks: View 04RANGOON647 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2004-05-21 08:06:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL SNAR PINR BM CH
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000647 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2014 
TAGS: PREL, SNAR, PINR, BM, CH 
SUBJECT: BURMESE REGIME'S STRATEGIC VIEWS OF U.S. AND CHINA 
 
REF: RANGOON 131 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ; REASON 1.4(D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The United States wants to dominate Burma 
in order to penetrate China's soft underbelly, according to 
Burmese Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt.  The PM, speaking 
with a visiting ethnic leader, laid out his strategic views 
of the United States and China.  Burma must resist U.S. 
pressure, Khin Nyunt went on, as China would never stand for 
it and Burma could be destroyed.  While this view may strike 
some observers as ludicrous, Chinese and U.S. Cold War 
policies in the region -- specifically, alleged USG support 
for KMT remnants operating from Burma and Chinese aid to the 
ethnic guerrillas of the Communist Party of Burma -- continue 
to influence Burmese military views of U.S. intentions and 
potential Chinese reactions.  Khin Nyunt's tight relationship 
with the Wa and Kokang narco-warlords along the Sino-Burmese 
border, most of whom were members of the Communist Party of 
Burma (CPB), in part may reflect the GOB's concerns that a 
perceived Chinese and U.S. rivalry could embroil Burma.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Post has recently viewed a video of the December 2003 
meeting between Khin Nyunt and Karen National Union leader Bo 
Mya.  Post linguists deem an exile-produced translation of 
the dialogue to be generally accurate.  General Khin Nyunt is 
usually very formal and highly protocol conscious.  However, 
in this bizarre discussion Khin Nyunt and Bo Mya get quite 
personal, revealing that they both dye their hair while 
debating whether they should call each other "uncle/nephew" 
or "older brother/younger brother." 
 
3.  (SBU) After nearly a half hour of familial banter, 
General Khin Nyunt provides the following strategic overview 
of U.S. intentions toward Burma and China: 
 
Begin Translation: 
 
"America on the other side is exerting pressure.  That is 
because they want Myanmar to be their follower.  Only when 
Myanmar becomes their follower will they be able to penetrate 
China from the side ("using the side door").  Myanmar is a 
very important country or a strategic nation for America, Pha 
Tee ("uncle").  That is why America wants Myanmar to be their 
follower or keep it under its influence." 
 
"If Myanmar accepts that status, America will be able to use 
Myanmar as a staging ground to penetrate China.  That is the 
reason why America is exerting a lot of pressure on our 
nation.  Hence, we do not have the slightest bit of trust in 
America.  We will not be their follower, Pha Tee.  If we do 
that, our country will be destroyed.  Why would China stand 
for it?  Am I right?  If America were to penetrate China from 
our borders, China will not accept it, and our country will 
be in trouble." 
 
"Hence, in order to prevent our country from getting into 
trouble and make it stable, we have to associate with the 
Kala (derogatory term for Indian) and the Chinese.  But we 
cannot associate with America because it is exerting immense 
pressure on us.  We have to make friends with ASEAN countries 
and with neighboring countries." 
 
End Translation. 
 
4.  (SBU) A number of senior Burmese leaders have made their 
politico-military careers fighting the mutant legacies of 
USG-supported KMT units that retreated into northern Burma 
after the Chinese civil war a half-century ago.  In January 
Emboffs participating in a GOB tour of Shan State (reftel) 
noted that the five GOB cabinet ministers, all senior 
military officers, grew excited as the aircraft prepared to 
land at an isolated outpost.  One of the senior military 
officers turned to an embassy officer and explained, "This 
next stop is where the Commerce Minister led a successful 
attack against one of Khun Sa's last strongholds in 1995." 
(Note: The Mong Tai Army, led by drug lord Khun Sa, evolved 
from ethnic insurgents with previous links to the KMT 
remnants in Burma.  End Note) 
 
5.  (C) Part of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt's political (and 
financial?) clout comes from his close relationship with the 
Kokang and Wa cease-fire groups located along the 
Sino-Burmese border.  With 25,000 troops under arms, these 
groups control much of the legitimate and smuggled border 
trade with China.  Until its implosion in 1989, the CPB's 
formidable Peoples Army was manned by many Wa and Kokang 
troops and supported by the Communist Party of China.  Khin 
Nyunt's success of binding the border-straddling Wa and 
Kokang groups firmly to Burma has been one of his major 
accomplishments.  The United Wa State Army (UWSA) is 
currently led by a former member of the CPB Central Committee 
and is headquartered in the same town as was the CPB.  That 
the UWSA is the biggest narcotics outfit this side of 
Afghanistan means Khin Nyunt mingles with some pretty shady 
characters on a regular basis.  In August 2003 when Khin 
Nyunt lost the Secretary 1 title, UWSA troops went on full 
alert for two days, fearful that their main patron in Rangoon 
was being ousted. 
 
6.  (SBU) The National League for Democracy's leadership has 
also been affected by this dynamic.  The NLD's deputy 
chairman, U Tin Oo, earned his military reputation as a 
field-grade officer fighting KMT units; his rise to Minister 
of Defense meant that when he joined the NLD he was seen as a 
man of clout and influence.  He met his wife, an army doctor, 
after being wounded in combat against a KMT unit decades ago, 
he told us last year. 
7.  (U) SPDC spokesman Colonel Hla Min, in the April 2004 
edition of his work "Political Situation of the Union of 
Myanmar and Its Role in the Region," articulates the SPDC 
line that the United States seeks to dominate Burma in the 
context of U.S. strategy vis--vis China.  He writes: 
 
"Therefore, from the western point of view, Myanmar could be 
deemed to be the weak link in the regional China containment 
policy as primarily advocated by the United States.  Their 
attempt to turn Myanmar into a satellite state of the West by 
their blatant interference in Myanmar's internal affairs 
under the much abused and misused pretext of human rights and 
democracy is quite obvious." 
 
8.  (C) Comment and Conclusion:  The regime's seemingly 
reflexive anti-Americanism may in part be based on this 
time-warped strategic view of U.S. intentions toward China 
and the fear that Burma would be caught in between.  This 
strategic misperception is reinforced by the current, 
entirely deserved criticism the USG regularly levels at the 
junta.  It is perhaps understandable that during the height 
of the Cold War era the Burmese military may have viewed the 
KMT units in Burma as America's surrogates and saw the CPB's 
Wa and Kokang guerrillas as China's proxies.  Paradoxically, 
if the Burmese regime's embrace of China is meant to help it 
maintain its sovereignty in the face of perceived American 
efforts to make Burma a U.S. satellite, this poses a 
substantial risk to Burma's future -- Chinese trade, 
investment, cultural, and political inroads, especially in 
northern and northeastern Burma, are becoming increasingly 
dominant.  End comment. 
Martinez 

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