US embassy cable - 00ANKARA8112 (original version)

TURKEY: 2000 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT (original version)

Identifier: 00ANKARA8112
Wikileaks: View 00ANKARA8112 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2000-12-11 11:47:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PTER TU
Redacted: This cable was redacted by Wikileaks. [Show redacted version] [Compare redacted and unredacted version]
P 111147Z DEC 00
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9745
INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 
AMCONSUL ADANA 
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 008112 
 
S/CT FOR REAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/10 
TAGS: PTER, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2000 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: STATE 217248 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM JAMES F. JEFFREY FOR REASONS: 1.5 
(B) AND (D). 
 
-------- 
OVERVIEW 
-------- 
 
1.  (U) COMBATTING TERRORISM IS A MAJOR PRIORITY IN 
TURKEY'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY.  THE GOT APPROACHES 
THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISTS WITH AN OUTLOOK SIMILAR TO THE 
USG'S INTERNATIONAL, COORDINATED APPROACH.  THE DANGER 
POSED TO TURKEY BY TERRORISM IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACT 
THAT THE THREE POSTS OF THE U.S. MISSION TO TURKEY 
CONSTITUTE 50 PERCENT OF THE HIGH-THREAT POSTS IN THE 
EUROPEAN BUREAU (EUR).  MOREOVER, THE NUMBER OF TERRORIST 
GROUPS IN TURKEY EXCEEDS THE NUMBER IN THE REST OF THE 
HIGH-THREAT EUR COUNTRIES COMBINED.  INTERNATIONAL AND 
DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS IN TURKEY INCLUDE SEPARATIST, 
RADICAL ISLAMIST, LEFTIST, AND TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS. 
RIGHT-WING TERRORISM, WHICH USED TO BE AN ISSUE FOR 
TURKEY, IS NOW LARGELY DEFUNCT.  RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE, TO 
THE EXTENT THAT IT EXISTS, OPERATES AT THE LEVEL OF 
CRIMINAL MAFIA GANGS. 
 
U.S.-DESIGNATED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
 
2.  (U) THE BEST-KNOWN TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS IN 
TURKEY ARE THE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK) AND THE 
REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT (DHKP/C, 
FORMERLY KNOWN AS DEV-SOL).  ON OCTOBER 8, 1997, THE 
SECRETARY OF STATE DESIGNATED BOTH GROUPS AS FOREIGN 
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS SUBJECT TO THE ANTITERRORISM AND 
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996.  ON OCTOBER 8, 1999, 
THE SECRETARY RENEWED THOSE DESIGNATIONS. 
 
LEFTIST TERROR ORGANIZATIONS 
 
3.  (U) BEYOND THE PKK AND DHKP/C, THERE ARE SEVERAL 
LEFTIST AND ISLAMIST TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATING IN 
TURKEY.  MANY OF THESE GROUPS ARE SMALL AND RELATIVELY 
INACTIVE, THOUGH THEY HAVE TARGETED FOREIGNERS, INCLUDING 
AMERICANS, IN THE PAST.  ONE OF THE MORE ACTIVE LEFTIST 
GROUPS IS THE TURKISH WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' LIBERATION 
ARMY (TIKKO).  OTHER GROUPS INCLUDE THE TURKISH COMMUNIST 
LABORERS' PARTY/LENINIST (TKEP/L), THE TURKISH 
REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY (TDKP), THE MARXIST 
LENINIST COMMUNIST PARTY/LIBERATION (MLKP/K), AND THE 
TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNISTS UNIT (TIKB). 
 
ISLAMIST TERROR ORGANIZATIONS 
 
4.  (U) THE ACTIVE ISLAMIST ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY ARE 
THE ISLAMIC GREAT EASTERN RAIDERS' FRONT (IBDA/C), 
TURKISH HIZBULLAH, AND THE "JERUSALEM WARRIORS."  IN 
2000, THE IBDA/C'S TEMPO OF OPERATIONS WAS LOW. 
HIZBULLAH, HOWEVER, WAS IN THE SPOTLIGHT BECAUSE TURKISH 
NATIONAL POLICE (TNP) RAIDS EXPOSED THE ALARMING REACH OF 
THE ORGANIZATION AND THE SURPRISING NUMBER OF COVERT 
MURDERS IT HAD STAGED.  THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ALSO CAME 
TO PUBLIC ATTENTION IN 2000.  THOUGH TURKISH HIZBULLAH 
AND THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ARE NOT RELATED TO EACH OTHER, 
THE TNP UNCOVERED EVIDENCE FROM ITS RAIDS ON TURKISH 
HIZBULLAH THAT EXPOSED SOME OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS 
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.  THE ORGANIZATION IS ALLEGED TO BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATIONS OF SEVERAL PROMINENT 
TURKISH INTELLECTUALS, FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, AND A U.S. 
SERVICE MEMBER. 
 
5.  (U) THE CAPITALIZED TITLES BELOW CORRESPOND TO REFTEL 
QUESTIONS.  WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE "MAJOR 
COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS" SECTION THAT IMMEDIATELY 
FOLLOWS, THEY ARE IN THE SAME ORDER AS THE QUESTIONS IN 
REFTEL. 
 
---------------------------------- 
MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS (E) 
---------------------------------- 
 
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 
 
6.  (U) DURING 2000, THE GOT CONTINUED TO SUPPORT 
EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, PROTOCOLS, AND 
AGREEMENTS ON TERRORISM.  THE GOT IS A SIGNATORY TO 
ELEVEN OF TWELVE UN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM CONVENTIONS. 
DURING 2000, THE "INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE 
SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS," WHICH TURKEY HAS 
SIGNED, WAS UNDERGOING THE PROCESS REQUIRED TO SECURE 
PARLIAMENTARY RATIFICATION.  TURKEY HAS NOT YET SIGNED 
THE "INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE 
FINANCING OF TERRORISM." 
 
 
[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX.] 
 
7.  (C) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS THE GOT HAS EXERCISED 
ITS RIGHT TO INSPECT THE CARGO OF IRANIAN FLIGHTS 
TRANSITING TURKISH AIRSPACE EN ROUTE TO LEBANON.  IN 
LIGHT OF IRAN'S SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE HIZBULLAH, THIS WAS 
A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT 
AGAINST TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST.  WITH LIMITED 
SUCCESS, THE TURKS ALSO CONTINUALLY USE DIPLOMATIC 
CHANNELS TO URGE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO TAKE 
ACTION AGAINST THE EUROPEAN FRONT ORGANIZATIONS OF THE 
PKK, DHKP/C AND OTHER GROUPS. 
 
FIGHT AGAINST THE PKK 
 
8.  (U) ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT, THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES 
(TSK), JANDARMA (A PARAMILITARY POLICE FORCE), TNP, AND 
VILLAGE GUARDS (PARAMILITARY GUARD FORCES RECRUITED FROM 
AMONG SOUTHEASTERN VILLAGERS) CONTINUED VIGOROUS 
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS TO SUPPRESS THE PKK 
THROUGHOUT EASTERN TURKEY AND IN NORTHERN IRAQ. 
CONTINUING GOT COUNTERINSURGENCY SUCCESSES AND THE PKK'S 
SELF-PROCLAIMED CEASE-FIRE LED TO A DECREASE IN TERRORIST 
ACTIVITY COMPARED TO PREVIOUS YEARS.  ACCORDING TO THE 
TURKISH GENERAL STAFF (TGS), FOR THE FIRST ELEVEN MONTHS 
OF THIS YEAR THERE WERE 45 PKK-RELATED INCIDENTS, 
COMPARED TO 3,298 FOR THE FULL YEAR OF 1994.  IN 2000, AS 
IN PREVIOUS YEARS, MORE THAN 200,000 SECURITY PERSONNEL 
REMAINED DEDICATED TO COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN 
EASTERN TURKEY AND NORTHERN IRAQ.  LARGE, MULTI-UNIT 
COMBINED-ARMS OPERATIONS WERE NOT NECESSARY; MOST 
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY SMALLER 
UNITS ON A CONTINUING BASIS. 
 
9.  (U) TURKEY'S SOUTHEASTERN EFFORTS BORE FRUIT IN THE 
WAKE OF OCALAN'S 1999 CAPTURE.  A MEASURE OF TURKEY'S 
SUCCESS WAS A STEEP DECREASE IN PKK-RELATED INCIDENTS IN 
2000 AS COMPARED WITH 1999.  AS A RESULT OF THE DECREASE, 
THE TSK WAS INCREASINGLY ABLE TO HAND OVER ANTI-TERRORIST 
OPERATIONS TO THE JANDARMA AND TNP.  ANOTHER INDICATION 
OF THE GOT'S PROGRESS AGAINST THE PKK WAS PARLIAMENT'S 
JUNE 2000 APPROVAL OF A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
RECOMMENDATION CALLING FOR VAN PROVINCE TO BE REMOVED 
FROM THE STATE OF EMERGENCY REGION (OHAL).  THE OHAL IS 
NOW REDUCED TO FOUR PROVINCES (DIYARBAKIR, HAKKARI, 
SIRNAK, AND TUNCELI). 
 
10.  (U) IN ADDITION TO CONDUCTING COUNTERINSURGENCY 
OPERATIONS, THE GOT CONTINUES ITS ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS 
ECONOMIC DISPARITIES IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY.  THE GOT 
INTENDS FOR THESE EFFORTS, THE MOST PROMINENT OF WHICH IS 
THE SOUTHEAST ANATOLIA PROJECT (GAP), TO REDUCE THE 
POVERTY AND DESPERATION THAT IT BELIEVES ARE THE ROOT 
CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN THE REGION.  UNFORTUNATELY, 
TURKEY'S ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS MEAN THAT MANY OF THESE 
EFFORTS ARE UNDER-FUNDED, IF FUNDED AT ALL.  FROM A MORE 
POLITICAL APPROACH, THE GOT HAS NOT MOVED QUICKLY TO 
GRANT THE GREATER INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO ETHNIC KURDS THAT 
WOULD UNDERCUT THE SUPPORT ENJOYED IN THE REGION BY THE 
PKK.  THE GOT AND TURKISH SOCIETY AS A WHOLE HAVE YET TO 
DEVELOP A CONSENSUS ON HOW TO ACCOMMODATE THE DESIRE OF 
SOME TURKISH CITIZENS' TO EXPRESS THEIR KURDISH CULTURE. 
 
[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX.] 
 
11.  (C) DESPITE TURKEY'S MILITARY SUCCESS AGAINST 
KURDISH TERRORISM, THE PKK'S RELUCTANCE TO CHALLENGE THE 
GOT STEMS, TO SOME EXTENT, FROM ITS LOYALTY TO ABDULLAH 
OCALAN AND THE DESIRE TO AVOID CAUSING HIS EXECUTION. 
THE PKK'S PERSONALITY-CULT MINDSET MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR 
MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION TO ABANDON OCALAN BY IGNORING 
HIS CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE.  HOWEVER, WITH APPROXIMATELY 
5,000 PKK TERRORISTS UNDER ARMS OUTSIDE OF TURKEY, THE 
POSSIBILITY REMAINS THAT KURDISH TERRORISM WILL RETURN TO 
TURKEY, PERHAPS VIA A PKK FACTION OR SPLINTER GROUP. 
THIS BECOMES MORE LIKELY AS THE PKK CONTINUES TO SUFFER 
MILITARY DEFEATS FROM NORTHERN IRAQ'S KURDISH GROUPS, IN 
ADDITION TO THE TSK. 
 
ON-GOING SUPPRESSION OF DHKP/C 
 
12.  (U) DURING 2000, TURKISH SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED 
THEIR ON-GOING AND EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN TO DISRUPT THE 
DHKP/C THROUGH RAIDS AND ARRESTS.  THE TNP'S VIGILANCE 
CONTRIBUTED TO A YEAR IN WHICH DHKP/C INCIDENTS WERE RARE 
AND RELATIVELY MINOR.  NOTABLE WAS THE TNP'S AUGUST 
ARREST OF SEVEN ALLEGED DHKP/C TERRORISTS WHO APPARENTLY 
WERE PLANNING AN ATTACK ON INCIRLIK AIRBASE, FROM WHICH 
U.S./UK/TURKISH COMBINED TASK FORCE ENFORCES THE "NO-FLY 
ZONE" OVER NORTHERN IRAQ. 
 
MAJOR PUSH AGAINST HIZBULLAH 
 
13.  (U) TURKISH HIZBULLAH (HIZBULLAH), WHICH WAS FOUNDED 
IN THE 1980S IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY, IS A SUNNI-ISLAM 
KURDISH GROUP NOT RELATED TO LEBANESE HIZBULLAH. 
HIZBULLAH HAS GENERALLY TARGETED ETHNIC-KURDS, 
PARTICULARLY BUSINESS AND CULTURAL FIGURES WHO WERE NOT 
SUFFICIENTLY ISLAMIST IN THE ORGANIZATION'S EYES.  IT 
ALSO FOLLOWS A PATTERN OF TARGETING ITS OWN FORMER 
MEMBERS WHO HAVE BROKEN RANKS OR SIMPLY MOVED ON FROM THE 
ORGANIZATION. 
 
14.  (U) OVER THE COURSE OF 1999, HIZBULLAH INCREASED ITS 
OPERATIONS IN ISTANBUL, WHERE THE DISAPPEARANCES OF 
ETHNIC-KURDISH BUSINESSMEN EVENTUALLY ATTRACTED POLICE 
ATTENTION.  INVESTIGATIONS LED TO THE JANUARY 17 TNP RAID 
ON A HIZBULLAH SAFEHOUSE THAT WAS FORTUITOUSLY ALSO 
SERVING AS HIZBULLAH'S HEADQUARTERS.  IMMEDIATE RESULTS 
OF THE RAID WERE THE DEATH OF HIZBULLAH LEADER HUSEYIN 
VELIOGLU AND THE DISCOVERY ON THE PREMISES OF THE BODIES 
OF SOME OF THE MISSING BUSINESSMEN.  IN THE WEEKS 
FOLLOWING, A TROVE OF EVIDENCE FROM THE RAID ALLOWED THE 
GOT TO CONDUCT A SERIES OF WIDE-RANGING RAIDS TO ROLL UP 
MUCH OF THE ORGANIZATION.  THE TNP CAPTURED OR KILLED 
MUCH OF HIZBULLAH'S LEADERSHIP, SEIZED SEVERAL CACHES OF 
WEAPONS, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, DISCREDITED ITS 
EXTREMISM BY EXPOSING EVIDENCE OF 156 MURDERS. 
 
15.  (U) THOUGH SUCH RAIDS INFLICTED SEVERE DAMAGE ON 
HIZBULLAH, THE ORGANIZATION CONTINUES TO EXIST, AS 
DEMONSTRATED BY THE GOT'S UNRELENTING PURSUIT OF ITS 
REMNANTS AND WITH WEEKLY REPORTS OF RAIDS AND ARRESTS. 
VIEWING STATISTICS FOR THE OHAL ONLY, THE MAGNITUDE OF 
THE GOT ACTIVITY AGAINST HIZBULLAH IS CLEAR, EVEN THOUGH 
FULL YEAR 2000 FIGURES WERE NOT YET AVAILABLE.  FOR ALL 
OF 1999, THERE WERE 267 ANTI-HIZBULLAH OPERATIONS, WITH 
420 SUSPECTS ARRESTED OUT OF A TOTAL OF 1366 TAKEN INTO 
TEMPORARY CUSTODY.  FIGURES FOR 2000 UNTIL THE END OF 
OCTOBER SHOW 723 OPERATIONS, WITH 1744 SUSPECTS ARRESTED 
OUT OF 2712 TAKEN INTO TEMPORARY CUSTODY. 
 
16.  (U) TURKISH HIZBULLAH HAS NOT YET ACTED AGAINST U.S. 
CITIZENS, PERSONNEL, OR FACILITIES, OR AGAINST THE 
TURKISH STATE, EXCEPT IN REACTION TO POLICE RAIDS. 
NONETHELESS, HIZBULLAH HARBORS EXTREME ANTI-WESTERN VIEWS 
AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ORGANIZATION MAY SHIFT ITS 
ATTENTION TO FOREIGNERS, TO INCLUDE AMERICANS, IN THE 
FUTURE.  DURING 2000, GOT OFFICIALS AND THE TURKISH MEDIA 
ALLEGED THAT HIZBULLAH HAD IRANIAN LINKS AND SUPPORT. 
 
CAPTURE OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS 
 
17.  (U) THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS, WHICH REPORTEDLY IS A 
SUB-GROUP OF A LARGER GROUP CALLED TEVHIT ("UNITY" OR 
"MONOTHEISM"), IS AN ETHNIC TURKISH, EXTREME ISLAMIST 
GROUP.  ITS MEMBERS ARE SUNNI MOSLEMS WHO SEEK TO 
ESTABLISH ISLAMIST RULE IN TURKEY.  AS NOTED ABOVE, 
HIZBULLAH AND THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ARE NOT DIRECTLY 
RELATED.  NONETHELESS, THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS HAD 
SUFFICIENT CONTACT THAT THE TNP'S RAIDS AGAINST HIZBULLAH 
PRODUCED EVIDENCE THAT IDENTIFIED THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS 
AND RESULTED IN THEIR MAY CAPTURE.  ACCORDING TO SOME GOT 
OFFICIALS AND THE SUSPECTS' MEDIA-REPORTED CONFESSIONS, 
THIS PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE 
HAD IRANIAN TRAINING, SUPPORT, AND DIRECTION.  THE 
ORGANIZATION STANDS ACCUSED OF THE PREVIOUSLY UNSOLVED 
MURDERS OF SECULARIST INTELLECTUALS, THE MOST PROMINENT 
OF WHOM WHERE UGUR MUMCU, AHMET TANER KISLALI, MUAMMER 
AKSOY, AND BAHRIYE UCOK.  THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS 
ALLEGEDLY MURDERED FOREIGNERS AS WELL, INCLUDING USAF 
SSGT VICTOR MARVICK AND EGYPTIAN, INDIAN, ISRAELI, AND 
SAUDI DIPLOMATS. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO ACTS OF TERRORISM (A) 
------------------------------------------ 
 
18.  (U) TURKEY'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM TAKES A VIGOROUS 
APPROACH TO ENFORCING THE COUNTRY'S COUNTERTERRORISM 
LAWS.  OF THE APPROXIMATELY 150-200 TERRORISM-RELATED 
CASES PROSECUTED IN TURKEY'S STATE SECURITY COURTS, THREE 
STOOD OUT THIS YEAR. 
 
STATUS OF ABDULLAH OCALAN'S CASE 
 
19.  (U) ON JUNE 29, 1999, ANKARA STATE SECURITY COURT 
NO. 2 CONVICTED ABDULLAH OCALAN OF TREASON UNDER ARTICLE 
125 OF THE TURKISH PENAL CODE AND SENTENCED HIM TO DEATH. 
ON NOVEMBER 25, 1999, THE NINTH COURT OF APPEALS UPHELD 
THE VERDICT.  ON JANUARY 12, 2000, PRIME MINISTER BULENT 
ECEVIT ANNOUNCED HIS DECISION NOT TO FORWARD CONVICTED 
PKK LEADER ABDULLAH OCALAN'S DEATH PENALTY SENTENCE TO 
PARLIAMENT, WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED TO APPROVE HIS 
EXECUTION.  THIS DECISION WAS MADE IN CONSIDERATION THE 
APPEAL OCALAN'S TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
(ECHR).  IN NOVEMBER 2000, THAT APPEAL WAS TAKEN UP BY 
THE ECHR AND IS EXPECTED TO REQUIRE AT LEAST A YEAR-AND- 
A-HALF TO RESOLVE. 
 
MAIN HIZBULLAH TRIAL 
 
20.  (U) THOUGH THERE ARE MULTIPLE COURT ACTIONS ARISING 
FROM THE GOT'S SUCCESSES AGAINST HIZBULLAH, THE MAIN 
TRIAL FOR 156 MURDERS OPENED IN JULY IN DIYARBAKIR'S 
STATE SECURITY COURT AND CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE 
REMAINDER OF 2000, WITH A DECISION EXPECTED SOMETIME IN 
2001.  AMONG THE 15 ACCUSED WERE VELIOGLU DEPUTIES CEMAL 
TUTAR AND EDIP GUMUS, WHO ALLEGEDLY HANDLED THE 
ORGANIZATION'S "MILITARY" AND "POLITICAL" ACTIVITIES. 
 
JERUSALEM WARRIORS TRIAL 
 
21.  (U) THE TRIAL OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS AND THEIR 
ACCOMPLICES OPENED IN ANKARA ON AUGUST 14.  17 SUSPECTS 
WERE CHARGED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF INVOLVEMENT IN 22 
MURDERS OVER THE COURSE OF TEN YEARS.  AS NOTED ABOVE, 
AMONG THE VICTIMS WHERE PROMINENT SECULARIST 
INTELLECTUALS AND JOURNALISTS, FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, AND ONE 
U.S. SERVICE MEMBER, USAF SSGT VICTOR MARVICK. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
EXTRADITIONS INVOLVING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (B) 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
22.  (U) IN 2000 THERE WERE NO EXTRADITIONS ON TERRORISM- 
RELATED CHARGES FROM TURKEY TO THE UNITED STATES. 
LIKEWISE, THERE WERE NO SUCH EXTRADITIONS FROM THE UNITED 
STATES TO TURKEY, NOR WERE THERE ANY SUCH EXTRADITIONS 
FROM OTHER COUNTRIES TO TURKEY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
IMPEDIMENTS TO PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION (C) 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
23.  (U) FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, TURKEY HAS LONG FACED 
DIFFICULTY IN THE EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 
FROM OTHER COUNTRIES.  SYRIA, IRAQ, AND IRAN HAVE LONG 
HARBORED PKK TERRORISTS, WHICH THEY USE AS A TOOL IN 
THEIR RELATIONS WITH TURKEY.  IN EUROPE THERE IS 
CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR KURDISH POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS. 
THE PKK HAS FOUND PROTECTION FROM PROSECUTION OR 
EXTRADITION THERE DUE SOME GOVERNMENTS' INABILITY TO 
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN LEGITIMATE KURDISH POLITICAL AND 
CULTURAL ASPIRATIONS AND SUPPORT FOR PKK TERRORISM.  THE 
DHKP/C AND OTHER LEFTIST TERROR GROUPS HAVE ALSO BEEN 
ABLE TO OPERATE IN EUROPE UNDER A SHIELD OF CONCERNS 
ABOUT TURKEY'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. 
 
24.  (U) A KEY IMPEDIMENT TO EXTRADITIONS OF TERRORIST 
SUSPECTS FROM EUROPE IS TURKEY'S LEGAL PROVISION FOR 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, EVEN THOUGH A DE FACTO MORATORIUM 
EXISTS.  SINCE 1984, 28 TERRORISTS, MOST NOTABLY PKK 
LEADER ABDULLAH OCALAN, HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, BUT NO EXECUTION HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT SINCE 
THAT TIME.  NONETHELESS, AND DESPITE OBLIGATIONS UNDER 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON TERRORISM, SEVERAL COUNTRIES 
HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO EXTRADITE SUSPECTS TO TURKEY. 
THROUGHOUT 2000, PUBLIC DEBATE ON THE EVENTUAL ABOLITION 
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CONTINUED, WITH MOST OBSERVERS 
PREDICTING THAT TURKEY'S EU CANDIDACY STATUS WILL 
EVENTUALLY LEAD TO ABOLITION. 
 
25.  (U) ONE HIGH-PROFILE EXAMPLE OF A EUROPEAN REFUSAL 
TO EXTRADITE A SUSPECT SOUGHT BY TURKEY WAS THE CASE OF 
FEHRIYE ERDAL.  ERDAL, A MEMBER OF THE DHKP/C, WAS 
ACCUSED OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE JANUARY 1996 MURDER 
OF A PROMINENT INDUSTRIALIST, OZDEMIR SABANCI, AND TWO 
OTHER INDIVIDUALS.  THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT CITED TURKEY'S 
LEGAL PROVISION FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS AN OBSTACLE TO 
HER BEING RETURNED TO TURKEY, EVEN THOUGH TURKEY WAS 
WILLING TO PROMISE NOT TO EXECUTE HER.  THE BELGIAN 
GOVERNMENT ALSO CHARACTERIZED THE SPECIFIC CHARGES FOR 
WHICH THE GOT SOUGHT HER AS BEING "POLITICAL CRIMES." 
SHE REMAINS UNDER HOUSE ARREST IN BELGIUM PENDING A TRIAL 
ON MINOR WEAPONS CHARGES.  BELGIAN (AND OTHER) 
AUTHORITIES HAVE ALSO COMPLAINED THAT TURKEY'S 
EXTRADITION REQUEST WAS NOT PRESENTED IN A MANNER 
TACTICALLY CALCULATED TO ACHIEVE EXTRADITION AND HAVE 
SUGGESTED THAT A MORE SOPHISTICATED INTERNATIONAL 
APPROACH TO THE EXTRADITION ISSUE MAY HAVE PRODUCED A 
MORE WELCOME RESULT. 
 
26.  (U) TURKISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS REPORT 
THAT THEY HAVE REQUESTED EXTRADITIONS OF SUSPECTED PKK, 
DHKP/C, AND OTHER TERRORISTS FROM FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, 
AND THE UK IN RECENT YEARS.  ALL SUCH REQUESTS WERE 
REFUSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE SUSPECT MIGHT FACE 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THE CRIMES INVOLVED WERE POLITICAL, 
OR THE SUSPECTS MIGHT FACE PERSECUTION FOR POLITICAL 
BELIEFS. 
 
------------------------------------ 
RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION (D) 
------------------------------------ 
 
27.  (U) PRESIDENT SEZER, PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT, FOREIGN 
MINISTER CEM, CHIEF OF THE TGS GENERAL HUSEYIN 
KIVRIKOGLU, AND FORMER-PRESIDENT DEMIREL HAVE ALL MADE 
STRONG STATEMENTS DENOUNCING TERRORISM DURING 2000. 
THE GOT FREQUENTLY AND VIGOROUSLY MAKES PUBLIC 
CONDEMNATIONS OF ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM. 
 
------------------------------------ 
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (F) 
------------------------------------ 
 
28.  (U) THE GOT CONSISTENTLY AND STRONGLY OPPOSES BOTH 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.  TURKEY DOES NOT 
VIEW ITS MAINTENANCE OF DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL 
RELATIONS WITH CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, SUDAN, AND SYRIA 
AS CONSTITUTING SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
STATEMENTS SUPPORTING TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRIES (G) 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
29.  (U) THE GOT MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN 2000 IN 
SUPPORT OF TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRIES ON TERRORISM 
ISSUES. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM (H) 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
30.  (U) TURKISH OFFICIALS, IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, 
CONTINUE TO LABEL THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AS ONE OF 
THE GOT'S TOP SECURITY PRIORITIES.  WHILE THE TSK 
CONTINUES ITS OPERATIONS AGAINST PKK TERRORISTS IN THE 
SOUTHEAST OF THE COUNTRY, THE TNP CARRIES ON ITS DILIGENT 
AND VIGOROUS WORK IN SUPPRESSING THE DHKP/C AND 
HIZBULLAH, WHICH PRIMARILY OPERATE IN URBAN AREAS. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES (I) 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
31.  (U) CLOSE U.S.-TURKISH COOPERATION CONTINUES TO BE 
STRENGTHENED BY 14 YEARS OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE 
STATE DEPARTMENT'S ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE (ATA) 
PROGRAMS.  ATA PROGRAMS INCLUDE MANDATORY HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMPONENTS.  GOT OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD EMBASSY OFFICIALS 
THAT THEY VIEW ATA PROGRAMS AS A POSITIVE STEP TOWARD 
BRINGING TURKISH POLICE STANDARDS INTO GREATER CONFORMITY 
WITH EU AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS. 
 
32.  (U) TURKEY COOPERATES WITH THE UNITED STATES IN ITS 
EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM IN CENTRAL ASIA.  IN JUNE 
2000, A GOT OBSERVER ATTENDED A CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON 
DESIGNED TO PROMOTE COUNTERTERRORISM DIALOGUE AMONG 
KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, 
UZBEKISTAN.  TURKISH OFFICIALS HAVE REGULARLY 
PARTICIPATED IN COUNTER-TERRORISM CONSULTATIONS WITH THE 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.  SUCH CONSULTATIONS ARE AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION AND COORDINATE 
STRATEGY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
COOPERATION - INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS (J) 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
33.  (U) THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES AND TURKEY, WHICH ENTERED INTO FORCE IN 
JANUARY 1981, GOVERNS INVESTIGATIVE COOPERATION.  THE GOT 
HAS EXPEDITIOUSLY PROCESSED REQUESTS FOR INVESTIGATIVE 
ACCESS TO EVIDENCE UNDER THIS TREATY.  HOWEVER, IN SOME 
CASES THE GOT HAS LEFT REQUESTS UNANSWERED FOR OVER THREE 
YEARS.  THERE WERE NO REQUESTS MADE TO THE GOT IN 2000. 
 
34.  (U) IN 1999 THE USG REQUESTED AND RECEIVED 
INFORMATION RELATED TO THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
ATTEMPTED DHKP/C ROCKET ATTACK ON THE U.S. CONSULATE 
GENERAL IN ISTANBUL.  THIS YEAR THE THREE TNP OFFICERS 
WHO PREVENTED THE ATTACK WERE TRIED ON CHARGES OF HAVING 
EXTRA-JUDICIALLY MURDERED THE DHKP/C SUSPECTS.  THE CASE 
REMAINS ON-GOING. 
 
35.  (U) OVERALL, IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, THE GOT HAS 
WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE USG IN THE APPREHENSION, 
CONVICTION, AND PUNISHMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR 
TERRORIST ATTACKS IN TURKEY.  THE MOST PROMINENT EXAMPLE 
OF THE GOT'S AGGRESSIVE EFFORTS TO BRING TERRORISTS TO 
JUSTICE IS THE ARREST AND ON-GOING TRIAL OF FOUR SUSPECTS 
IN THE 1991 ASSASSINATION OF USAF SSGT VICTOR MARVICK IN 
ANKARA.  THE TRIAL OF THE FOUR, WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY 
MEMBERS OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS, AN ISLAMIST TERROR 
GROUP, BEGAN IN AUGUST 2000.  THESE INDIVIDUALS, AND 
THEIR 13 COHORTS, STAND ACCUSED OF ALMOST A SCORE OF 
OTHER MURDERS AND ATTACKS, AS NOTED ABOVE. 
 
[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX] 
 
36.  (S) IN 2000 THERE WAS ONE EXTRADITION FROM TURKEY TO 
THE UNITED STATES INVOLVING AN INDIVIDUAL WITH SUSPECTED 
TERRORIST CONNECTIONS WHO HAD ALSO COMMITTED A VARIETY OF 
NON-TERROR RELATED CRIMES IN THE UNITED STATES.  THIS 
EXTRADITION, WHICH WAS EFFECTED IN THE SPACE OF 
APPROXIMATELY FIVE MONTHS, WAS AN EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL 
U.S.-TURKISH COOPERATION.  THE SMOOTH EXECUTION OF THE 
EXTRADITION WAS PARTICULARLY NOTABLE BECAUSE THE MOST 
RECENT PREVIOUS EXTRADITION, WHICH HAD NO TERRORISM 
ASPECT, WAS IN 1993. 
 
---------------------------- 
COOPERATION - PREVENTION (K) 
---------------------------- 
 
37.  (U) THE GOT PROVIDES THE USG AND, IN PARTICULAR, 
U.S. SECURITY OFFICERS IN TURKEY WITH UP-TO-DATE 
INFORMATION REGARDING TERRORIST GROUP OPERATIONS. 
MOREOVER, THE GOT PROVIDES EXTENSIVE POLICE SUPPORT TO 
DETER AND PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. 
PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN TURKEY.  TURKEY PROVIDES 
DEDICATED TNP GUARDS WHO WORK IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH 
MISSION SECURITY PERSONNEL AT THE THREE DIPLOMATIC POSTS 
IN TURKEY (ANKARA, ISTANBUL, AND ADANA).  TURKISH POLICE 
EXPEND LITERALLY TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PERSON-HOURS 
PROTECTING THE SECURITY OF MANY OFFICIAL AMERICAN 
RESIDENCES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.  THE TNP ALSO PROVIDES 
SECURITY MOTORCADE ESCORTS FOR MANY U.S. CIVILIAN AND 
MILITARY HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS EACH YEAR, INCLUDING FOR 
EVERY CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO VISIT TURKEY. 
 
[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX] 
 
38.  (S) IN THE LAST MONTHS OF 2000, U.S. FACILITIES IN 
TURKEY WERE SUBJECT TO ALMOST WEEKLY TERRORIST THREATS. 
IN PARTICULAR, INCIRLIK AIR BASE WAS SINGLED OUT AS THE 
SITE OF A POTENTIAL TERRORIST ATTACK.  IN RESPONSE, THE 
TURKS UPGRADED THE THREAT LEVEL AT THE BASE, WHICH 
INCLUDED ERECTING BARRICADES AROUND THE AMERICAN SECTOR 
OF THE BASE, INCREASING VEHICLE SECURITY CHECKS, 
PERFORMING 100 PERCENT IDENTIFICATION CHECKS, AND 
INSTALLING MORE CHECK POINTS IN THE CITY OF ADANA OUTSIDE 
INCIRLIK.  THE GOT ALSO PROVIDED ADDITIONAL PROTECTION IN 
DURING 6TH FLEET COMMANDER'S VISIT TO ANKARA AND DURING 
THE VISIT OF HIS FLAGSHIP, THE USS LASALLE, TO WESTERN 
TURKEY. 
 
39.  (S) IN OTHER ASPECTS OF COOPERATION AND PREVENTION, 
THE GOT'S COOPERATION HAS BEEN OUTSTANDING.  THE GOT HAS 
RESPONDED IN A POSITIVE AND FORWARD-LEANING MANNER WHEN 
THE USG HAS REQUESTED ASSISTANCE REGARDING 
COUNTERTERRORISM.  IN 2000, THE TURKISH NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (TNIO), TGS, AND TNP ALL WORKED 
CLOSELY WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE TO RENDER, DISRUPT, TRACK, 
AND ARREST TERRORISTS WHO WERE TRANSITING TURKEY TO 
CONDUCT TERRORIST OPERATIONS OR WHO WERE BENT ON CAUSING 
HARM WITHIN TURKEY ITSELF.  WHEN ASKED, THE GOT WATCH- 
LISTED INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT HAVE ARRIVED AT ONE OF 
TURKEY'S PORTS ENTRY.  IT HAS PROVIDED THIS ASSISTANCE 
DESPITE, AT TIMES, VAGUELY-WORDED THREAT REPORTS THAT 
REQUIRED A SUBSTANTIAL PERSONNEL COMMITMENT TO DO A JOB 
THAT COULD HAVE BEEN PERFORMED WITH LESS EFFORT, HAD THE 
USG BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION. 
 
40.  (S) IN NOVEMBER 2000, THE TURKS PROVIDED EXCEPTIONAL 
ASSISTANCE TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE BY ARRESTING A USAMA BIN 
LADEN LIEUTENANT WHO ATTEMPTED TO TRANSIT TURKEY.  AT THE 
REQUEST OF THE USG, THE TURKEY RENDERED HIM TO JUSTICE IN 
A THIRD COUNTRY.  ALSO IN THE NOVEMBER/DECEMBER TIME 
FRAME, THE GOT AGGRESSIVELY PROVIDED COVERAGE OF THE 
MAJOR PORTS OF ENTRY IN AN ATTEMPT TO APPREHEND A SECOND 
AND EVEN MORE IMPORTANT PLAYER IN THE BIN LADIN 
ORGANIZATION. 
 
PEARSON 

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