US embassy cable - 00THEHAGUE1940

DUTCH THOUGHTS ON RS WALKOUT OF SRCC, SERB OPPOSITION AND KPC FUNDING

Identifier: 00THEHAGUE1940
Wikileaks: View 00THEHAGUE1940 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2000-06-27 16:08:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PARM EAID PREL MARR BK SR HR NL OSCE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001940 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR S/SA (AMB PARDEW), EUR/SCE, EUR/RPM, EUR/EEA, 
STATE ALSO FOR INL, EUR/UBI 
ROME ALSO PASS AMB SKLAR 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2010 
TAGS: PARM, EAID, PREL, MARR, BK, SR, HR, NL, OSCE 
SUBJECT: DUTCH THOUGHTS ON RS WALKOUT OF SRCC, SERB 
OPPOSITION AND KPC FUNDING 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 120453 
     B. BUDAPEST 1952 
     C. BUDAPEST 1953 
     D. SECSTATE 119583 
 
 
 CLASSIFIED BY A/POLCOUNS ERIC LUNDBERG; REASONS 1.5 (B,D). 
 
 
1.(C)  SUMMARY: THE DUTCH ARE DISMAYED, BUT NOT SURPRISED, BY 
THE RS WALKOUT FROM THE ARTICLE IV SRCC. IN OTHER MATTERS, 
THE HAGUE IS RECONSIDERING ITS VIEW OF THE OPPOSITION IN 
SERBIA.  THE NETHERLANDS ALSO FEELS SHUT OUT OF DISCUSSIONS 
ABOUT THE FUTURE OF KOSOVO, BUT IS OPEN, ON A LIMITED BASIS, 
TO SOME ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE KPC, PROVIDED IT GOES 
THROUGH THE UNMIK REGULAR BUDGET.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
 
RS WALKOUT OF ART. IV SRCC 
--------------------------- 
2.(C)  POLOFF DISCUSSED REF. A WITH BALKANS OFFICE ACTING 
DIRECTOR JOEP WIJNANDS ON 6/27.  WIJNANDS INDICATED THAT THE 
DUTCH WERE DISMAYED, BUT NOT SURPRISED, BY THE RS BEHAVIOR 
AND SAW THE WALKOUT AS PART OF A CONTINUING POLARIZATION 
TREND IN BOSNIA. HE SAID THAT THE DUTCH EMBASSY IN SARAJEVO 
WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO IMPRESS UPON RS OFFICIALS THAT 
CONTINUING LINKS TO THE VJ WOULD BE PERCEIVED NEGATIVELY BY 
THE HAGUE. ADDITIONALLY, WIJNANDS NOTED THAT THE DUTCH WOULD 
MENTION TO OHR PETRITSCH THAT A SIMILAR LINE NEEDED TO BE 
PRESENTED TO BOTH RS POLITICAL LEADERS AND SERB BIH 
OFFICIALS.  FINALLY, WIJNANDS SAID THAT HE WOULD USE THE 
OPPORTUNITY OF A PRE-EXISTING 6/27 APPOINTMENT WITH FRY 
EMBASSY OFFICIALS TO UNDERSCORE DUTCH DISPLEASURE WITH THE RS 
OFFICIAL'S BEHAVIOR AND THE NEED FOR THE FRY TO ENCOURAGE THE 
RS TO COOPERATE WITH THE DAYTON PROCESS. HE SAID THAT HE 
HARBORED FEW ILLUSIONS ABOUT PREDICTABLE FRY REACTIONS TO 
SUCH A MESSAGE, BUT NONETHELESS FOUND IT A WORTHWHILE POINT 
TO RAISE WITH THE FRY AS OPPORTUNITIES AROSE. 
 
 
 
 
WHITHER THE SERB OPPOSITION ? 
----------------------------- 
3. (C)  PASSING ON REPORTING FROM THE DUTCH HOM IN BELGRADE, 
WIJNANDS OBSERVED THAT DRASKOVIC SEEMS TO BE KEEPING A LOW 
PROFILE AFTER THE RECENT SHOOTING INCIDENT IN MONTENEGRO. HE 
NOTED THAT THE DUTCH IN BELGRADE HAD HEARD MANY RUMORS ABOUT 
WHO MIGHT BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MURDER ATTEMPT AND 
FOUND FEW THAT CONVINCING (REFS. B/C).  THE ONE CONCLUSION 
THAT HE SAID DUTCH AND SOME OTHER EU OFFICIALS IN BELGRADE 
HAD REACHED WAS THAT DRASKOVIC WAS EVEN LESS LIKELY THAN 
BEFORE TO BE A PRODUCTIVE PARTNER FOR THE ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE 
OR OTPOR.  INCREASINGLY, WIJNANDS ADDED THAT THE DUTCH WERE 
DEFINING THE SERB POLITICAL SPECTRUM IN FOUR BROAD 
CATEGORIES: THE REGIME, DRASKOVIC/SPO, THE ALLIANCE FOR 
CHANGE, AND OTPOR.  HE SAID THAT THE DUTCH AND SOME EU 
BALKANS SPECIALISTS STILL HELD HOPE FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN 
THE ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE AND OTPOR ON FUTURE COMMON ELECTION 
SLATES AND CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION.  DRASKOVIC, ON THE OTHER 
HAND, THEY SAW AS SELF-MARGINALIZING AND UNLIKELY TO STRIKE 
AN ELECTORAL ALLIANCE WITH EITHER ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE OR 
OTPOR LEADERS.  THIS WOULD LIKELY PRODUCE FURTHER 
FRAGMENTATION THAT HE INTERPRETED AS A RECIPE FOR CONTINUING 
MILOSEVIC DOMINATION OF THE SERB POLITICAL SCENE.  WIJNANDS 
ALSO WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER THE U.S. AND EU SHOULD 
REINVIGORATE TRILATERAL COOPERATION WITH THE SERB OPPOSITION 
BASED ON THIS ASSESSMENT.  HE ALSO WAS CURIOUS AS TO WHETHER 
THE U.S. WOULD FIND IT USEFUL TO SEEK A SYMBOLIC RUSSIAN ROLE 
IN THE TRILATERAL PROCESS TO REDUCE WHAT HE SAW AS 
CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM OF THE OPPOSITION BY SERB NATIONALISTS 
FOR THEIR CURRENT COOPERATION WITH THE EU AND U.S.  HE 
OBSERVED THAT INCLUDING THE RUSSIANS AT THE MOMENT MIGHT BE 
MORE PROBLEMATICAL THAN IT WAS WORTH, ESPECIALLY RECALLING 
THEIR WALKOUT OF THE PIC AND UN MEETINGS. NEVERTHELESS, HE 
SUMMARIZED SUCH A BRIDGE-BUILDING EFFORT SHOULD NOT BE AN 
OPTION ENTIRELY RULED OUT FOR THE MID-TERM. 
 
 
KOSOVO POLITICAL COORDINATION STILL A SORE POINT IN THE HAGUE 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
 
4.(C)  FINALLY, POLOFF DISCUSSED THE REF. D KOSOVO PROTECTION 
CORPS (KPC) PROJECTED BUDGET SHORTFALL WITH WIJNANDS AND 
ASSISTANCE OFFICER NORBERT BOTH IN SEPARATE MEETINGS. 
WIJNANDS DEFERRED TO BOTH ON BUDGETARY ISSUES, BUT RECALLED 
THAT THE DUTCH FELT SOMEWHAT ESTRANGED FROM THE KPC AS AN 
INSTITUTION, HAVING NOT BEEN CONSULTED ON ITS CREATION OR 
PRIVY TO CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ITS ROLE IN THE 
KOSOVAR POLITICAL PROCESS . HE ADDED THAT THE DUTCH CONTINUED 
TO FEEL EXCLUDED FROM CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSION OF A 
U.S.-DRAFTED "FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT" FOR INTERIM STATUS FOR 
KOSOVO.  WHILE HE RECOGNIZED THAT PART OF THE FRICTION AROSE 
FROM WHAT HE CALLED "INADEQUATE EU DISCUSSION OF ISSUES TAKEN 
UP BY THE CONTACT GROUP," HE LEFT IT CLEAR THAT THE HAGUE 
ALSO RESENTS A PERCEIVED U.S. ROLE IN EXCLUDING THE DUTCH 
FROM DISCUSSIONS OF IMPORTANT BALKANS QUESTIONS FOR WHICH 
THEY ARE NONETHELESS REQUESTED TO PROVIDE MILITARY AND 
ASSISTANCE CONTRIBUTIONS.  THIS ASIDE, HE NOTED THAT DUTCH 
REVIEW OF THE "SUBSTANCE OF THE U.S. FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT" WAS 
"LARGELY FAVORABLE."  BOTH NOTED THAT THE PROJECTED KPC 
SHORTFALL WAS AN ISSUE ALREADY DISCUSSED WITHIN THE HIGH 
LEVEL STEERING GROUP AND THE DUTCH WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER 
UNMIK USE OF DUTCH BUDGETARY SUPPORT FUNDS FOR KPC SALARIES 
AND "REGULAR RECURRING COSTS," BUT NOT FOR CAPITAL 
INVESTMENTS.  HE MENTIONED "GUNS, CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT, 
HEAVY TOOLS, AND CARS" AS EXAMPLES OF KPC CAPITAL COSTS THAT 
THE NETHERLANDS DID NOT WISH TO SUPPORT. 
TOKOLA 

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