| Identifier: | 07VIENNA1231 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 07VIENNA1231 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Vienna |
| Created: | 2007-05-11 13:06:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV AU |
| Redacted: | This cable was redacted by Wikileaks. [Show redacted version] [Compare redacted and unredacted version] |
VZCZCXRO2488 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHVI #1231/01 1311306 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 111306Z MAY 07 FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7270 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 VIENNA 001231 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/AGS -- SAINT-ANDRE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, AU SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO VIENNA, MAY 31, 2007 -- BILATERAL ISSUES Classified By: Ambassador Susan R. McCaw. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ------------------------ Introduction and Summary ------------------------ 1. (C) Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer and Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik look forward eagerly to Secretary Rice's May 31 visit for the MFA's Conference on "Women Leaders -- Networking for Peace and Stability in the Middle East." In addition to furthering your women's empowerment initiative launched at the UN General Assembly last Fall, the conference fits well with Austria's outreach to the Middle East and to the Islamic world. Over the past three years, Austria has hosted two conferences of European Imams and a conference on "Islam in a Pluralistic World." 2. (C) Nevertheless, following a professional and successful EU Presidency during the first half of 2006, your visit comes at a time of increasing friction between the U.S. and the Austrian governments. This has involved conservative Foreign Minister Plassnik as much as social democratic Chancellor Gusenbauer. In fact, Austrian politicians from across the political spectrum have cast a series of issues -- a major Austrian energy investment in Iran, the decision by a soon-to-be U.S.-owned bank to close the accounts of Cuban nationals, the funneling of payments for bids on Iran's nuclear reactors through an Austrian bank, among others -- in terms of a self-righteous European defense against "extra-territorial" application of U.S. law. 3. (C) On Afghanistan, ISAF's UN mandate has still not overcome Austrian resistance to anything more than a symbolic presence or prevented some politicians from characterizing the fight as an "American war." Internal Austrian wrangling over fulfillment of a contract to purchase EADS Eurofighter aircraft has also taken on an anti-American coloring, as the current government has sought to blame the U.S. for delays in providing releases for a secure communications package. On missile defense, Plassnik has pointed to Austrian "concerns" in making comparisons to a Cold War-like nuclear standoff. On key counter-terrorism cases, recent court decisions have constrained generally positive working-level cooperation. 4. (C) The picture is fortunately not all negative. Austria continues to play a strong, constructive role in the Balkans, especially in Kosovo. Austrian engagement on Iraq has been small, but effective, from police training to the beginnings of commercial engagement. We have had a quiet, constructive discussion on the issue of Guantanamo detainees. 5. (C) In recent years, our leverage over Austrian policy has been extremely limited by the reality that there were very few things Vienna wanted from Washington. That situation, however, is now changing, as Austria has made securing a UN Security Council seat in 2009-2010 a top foreign policy priority. While we must handle the issue very deftly, Austrian officials should receive the message that odds of their obtaining our support will increase if the government begins to show more concern over issues of top priority for the United States. 6. (C) Suggested themes for the Secretary's bilateral meeting with Chancellor Gusenbauer, and conference side-bar conversations with FM Plassnik are contained in paras 30 and 31. End Summary. ------------------------ Neutrality as Engagement ------------------------ 7. (C) The United States and Austria share a strategic interest in a world of peace, democracy, prosperity and stability. A prime beneficiary of the successful conclusion of the Cold War, Austria has dedicated its foreign policy to the further construction of a European identity, the expansion of the zone of peace and stability to Southeast Europe, and the development of a more effective UN system. 8. (C) Austria's size and its post-war history, however, give the country a perspective that is different from that of the U.S., even on issues where we share ultimate objectives. Austrian neutrality, which the country adopted as a pragmatic response to obtain Soviet agreement to end the post-war occupation, has assumed almost mythical status as a part of Austria's national character. In the 1990s, Grand Coalition governments under Social Democratic (SPO) leadership took VIENNA 00001231 002 OF 006 tentative steps to modernize Austrian security policy by moving toward European and trans-Atlantic security structures. Since 2000, however, that rapprochement has stalled. The Spring 2004 election for the ceremonial office of President, in which moderate SPO leader Heinz Fischer defeated Benita Ferrero-Waldner, effectively represented a popular rejection of security links with NATO and even with key aspects of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Rather, the outcome signaled a resurgence of a strict definition of neutrality, under which a UN or EU "mandate" is a necessary -- but by no means sufficient -- condition for Austrian military engagement. 9. (C) The Grand Coalition that took office in January 2007 under Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer reflects a stable consensus among all Austrian political parties that neutrality is the cornerstone of the country's security policy. An important element of this consensus is a skepticism of the value of active military operations. Austrians of all political stripes are unapologetic about their lack of support for military engagement in the world's crisis areas. Instead, they believe that Austrian participation in classic UN peacekeeping operations, together with a relatively robust engagement in the Balkans, constitute an active contribution LAthe world's security. -------------------------------- Relations with the United States -------------------------------- 10. (C) On June 5, 2007, the U.S. and Austria will mark the 60th anniversary of Secretary George C. Marshall's Harvard speech that led to the European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan. A commemorative event at the Belvedere Palace, currently being organized by the Embassy and the Ministry of Economics, will be more than an academic exercise. The government of Austria owns and manages over 3.5 billion dollars in ERP counterpart funds. Bilateral agreements give the U.S. a continuing role in overseeing the funds. Businesses that benefit from ERP Fund financing are aware of the on-going nature of this relationship. Average Austrians, however, are less and less aware of the existence of the funds, or even of the historical importance of the Marshall Plan to Austria's post-war recovery. The June 5 Commemoration represents an important initiative, not only to keep the memory of the Marshall Plan alive, but to demonstrate its continued relevance in Austria. At the event, we plan to jointly announce the funding of 1,000 new transatlantic student exchange scholarships over the next 10 years (funded by Austria through ERP). 11. (C) In January, Austria inaugurated a new Grand Coalition government, led by social democratic Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer. One of Chancellor Gusenbauer's first official statements included a call for close relations with the United States. This was significant. Gusenbauer's rise in the Social Democratic party coincided with a focus among leftist European youth on the Vietnam War and debates over military stationing, rather than on U.S. support for Europe's post-war recovery. Gusenbauer's extensive international experience, including in leading positions in the Socialist International, has helped to broaden his perspective. Gusenbauer has told us that he very much hopes to visit Washington in the Fall of 2007. 12. (C) So far, since assuming office, Gusenbauer has not been particularly vocal on the U.S.-Austrian relationship. We would not be surprised, however, to see him indulge in confrontational rhetoric when it suits his needs. Already, on missile defense, for example, Gusenbauer said (alongside criticism of Russia) that "the U.S. has to understand that they are not the only ones that are going to determine what is happening in the world." In separate comments to the European Social Democrats, he was reportedly much more critical of the U.S. position. 13. (C) Some of Gusenbauer's key ministers have adopted an even sharper tone toward the U.S. in public. Defense Minister Norbert Darabos, who was SPO party manager under Gusenbauer, responded rather heatedly to continuing Embassy efforts to encourage a greater Austrian military role in Afghanistan. Darabos also seems to have encouraged the Austrian press to blame the U.S. for potential delays in Austria's receipt of secure communications packages for new Eurofighter aircraft. (In fact, the Austrian Defense Ministry, under Darabos's OVP predecessor, was responsible for delaying their application for the releases. When Darabos realized this, he shifted his focus to blaming his predecessor, who is now the Interior Minister.) VIENNA 00001231 003 OF 006 14. (C) It is not just the SPO members of the government who have adopted a confrontational tone. Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik, Schuessel's protegee, has adopted increasingly populist rhetoric, complaining publicly about U.S. "extraterritoriality" on several issues. When an Austrian bank (BAWAG), being purchased by the U.S. Cerberus group, moved to implement OFAC restrictions against Cuba by canceling the accounts of some 100 Cuban nationals citizens, Plassnik not only initiated legal action against the bank, but proclaimed loudly in Parliament that "Austria is not the 51st state of the U.S." 15. (C) Likewise, when the Austrian energy giant OMV recently announced a major gas deal with Iran, Plassnik joined in a chorus from across the political spectrum in attacking U.S. opposition to the move. The U.S. reaction had in fact consisted of responses to press inquires, and had focused on the political argument that this is not the time for business as usual with Iran. Plassnik, however, chose to attack the U.S. for "extraterritorial" application of law in connection with the Iran Sanctions Act, even though no such action had been taken. Plassnik, we would note, has also declined numerous Embassy requests to discuss bilateral issues. Once a moderating voice, Plassnik appears to be burnishing her political profile by "defending Austria" and Europe against American "unilateralism." 16. (C) Several other issues have reinforced this trend toward populism on the part of Austrian politicians. On May 3, parliamentarians from all political parties supported an initiative calling on the government to support European Parliament decisions to block the exchange of flight passenger data and to oppose U.S. use of SWIFT financial data in the fight against terrorism. Parliamentarians termed the latter a case of "industrial espionage" on the part of the U.S. 17. (C) Other issues on which Austria and the U.S. have had disagreements include agriculture and nuclear non-proliferation. OVP Agriculture Minister Josef Proell has made Austria a leader in the EU in opposing the use of genetically modified organisms (GMO) in agriculture. On WTO issues, Proell has won the internal policy debate against his Economics Ministry colleague, making Austria a firm opponent of EU moves to meet U.S. initiatives to reduce agricultural supports. On non-proliferation, Austria is one of the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) most critical of the U.S.-India civil nuclear energy deal. Foreign Minister Plassnik has spoken out negatively as well. 18. (C) Such bilateral differences between the US and Austria are not new, but there has been a shift in tone since the beginning of the year. Former Chancellor Schuessel's OVP government was never in a position to deliver robust support to the effort in Afghanistan, much less Iraq, for example, but they rarely went out of their way to poke the U.S. in the eye. To the contrary, if there was no domestic political price, Schuessel tended to seek ways to support the U.S., such as at the U.S.-EU Summit in June 2006, when the Chancellor defended the President against mindless criticism of U.S. policy concerning terrorist renditions and detentions. 19. (C) Counter-terrorism cooperation with Austria has been good at the professional level. Washington agencies will cover specific cases separately. In addition, Austrian views on relocating Guantanamo detainees is an important issue that we will address septel. ------------------------- Foreign Policy Priorities ------------------------- 20. (C) Despite a good deal of grumbling about "Brussels" in the popular press and among the public generally, in fact European integration and policy coordination remain at the center of Austria's world view. The new government's decision to change the name of the foreign ministry to the "Ministry for European and International Affairs" reflects the EU lens that colors Austria's view of the world. 21. (C) Beyond the EU, Austria has extensive commercial engagement in the entire eastern European and Balkan region, as well as in Russia. Austrian companies own almost one fourth of all the banking and insurance business in Eastern Europe (exclusive of Russia). However, this commercial engagement translates into broadly agreed vital foreign policy interests only in the Balkans. Beyond the profit motive driving trade and investment, Austria's concern for Balkan stability arises out of fears over refugee inflows and potential military conflicts if the region were to return to VIENNA 00001231 004 OF 006 the uncertainties of the 1990s. 22. (C) Austria has used all means available to it to enhance Balkan stability. Austrian military forces have been part of stability forces in Bosnia and Kosovo since the late 1990s. Its current deployment of over 300 troops in Bosnia and almost 600 troops in Kosovo is large in historical context. The Austrians have also put considerable resources into facilitating diplomatic efforts to bring stability to the region. The Foreign Ministry was a quiet but substantial source of support for Martti Ahtisaari's negotiating team. Austria also hosted conferences in 2004 and 2005 that brought together Kosovo Albanians, Serbs, and a range of representatives of regional governments, multilateral organizations, and non-government organizations. Austrian commercial penetration of the Balkan area, especially in Slovenia and Croatia, have helped to create conditions for growth and stability. 23. (C) The region of the former Soviet Union, and especially the countries that the EU's New Neighborhood Policy comprises, is next on the Austrians' list of priorities. Austria maintains a close eye on the development of democracy in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, and the future of Russia is a matter of keen interest to Vienna. Austrians doubt, however, that they can have much impact on political developments outside of their role in EU policy formulation. In the energy sector, the Austrian energy company OMV and Austrian banks have long worked with Russian energy suppliers. The Russian action of January 1, 2006 that resulted in a drop in gas deliveries to Western Europe came as a surprise to the Austrians. It has reintensified Austrian efforts to seek alternative supplies of gas and other energy sources. 24. (C) The Middle East -- especially the Levant and North Africa -- forms the outer reach of Austrian strategic efforts to secure stability. Plassnik has developed close working relations with a range of figures from the region, including Israeli Foreign Minister Livni and Palestinian Foreign Minister Abu Amr. 25. (C) In the areas of highest priority to the U.S. -- Iraq and Afghanistan -- Austria's engagement has been modest and episodic, but there have been some real contributions. Austrians were the first non-U.S./UK trainers to arrive at the Iraqi police academy in Jordan. Gusenbauer supports the continuation of their presence until the mission ends. Gusenbauer and Darabos have also made a commitment to maintain the presence of Austrian staff officers as part of ISAF, even if they have refused to increase the number of Austrians in Afghanistan. Austria fulfilled its 10 million dollars in financial pledges to Afghan reconstruction. In Iraq, Austrian firms have led the way, with Austrian Airlines becoming the first western carrier to offer scheduled commercial service to Iraq with a Vienna-Erbil connection. There is increasing interest among Austrian companies in finding opportunities in northern Iraq. However, Austria will not participate in deployments to Iraq. 26. (C) Austria considers itself a committed supporter of the UN system. Austrians have been part of UN peacekeeping operations for almost five decades, and it has long maintained a force of almost 300 troops in the Golan Heights. A key policy priority for the current Austrian government is winning a seat on the UN Security Council for the 2009-2010 session. Austrian officials raise this point with us at every opportunity, and we can expect them to continue to do so. 27. (C) A key element of Austria's global strategy is the encouragement of international dialogue. It is a tenet of Austria's national mythology that the country's ability to maintain ties throughout the world constitutes a real contribution to peace and stability. This has been a primary motivation behind a series of conferences Vienna has hosted aiming to build bridges between Islamic societies and the West. Austria hosted two conferences of European Imams in 2004 and 2006. In November 2005, a major conference on "Islam in a Pluralistic World" attracted Afghan President Karzai, Iraqi President Talibani, and former Iranian President Khatami. The Austrian initiative to host the May 31 conference on "Women Leaders -- Networking for Peace and Security in the Middle East" is a part of this strategy. 28. (C) More than most countries, Austria places great importance on conferences and ceremonials. Events like the May 2005 commemoration of the State Treaty signing, the November 2005 Islam conference, and the June 2006 U.S.-EU Summit serve as chapter headings in the scroll of modern VIENNA 00001231 005.2 OF 006 Austrian history. Beyond the substance of such events, the role they play in validating Austria's image of itself is important enough that the Austrians will go to great lengths to make them work. --------------------------------------------- ------ Secretary Rice's Meeting with Chancellor Gusenbauer SIPDIS --------------------------------------------- ------ 29. (C) In order to occupy the Chancellor's office, Gusenbauer traded away key ministries to the OVP, including Foreign Affairs, Economics, Finance and Interior. He also compromised on key campaign promises. At the government's January 11 swearing-in, many Social Democrats complained that Gusenbauer was "an SPO Chancellor in an OVP government." Perhaps in response, Gusenbauer has dug in his heels. In public, at least, the SPO and OVP have engaged in more or less constant back-biting. Nevertheless, the government has already lasted longer, and accomplished more, than many pundits predicted. The negotiation and passage of a two-year budget has helped to shore up the government's credibility. 30. (C) This will be the USG's first cabinet-level meeting with Gusenbauer as chancellor. It will be important to convey the message that we consider Austria a responsible and capable partner, with which the U.S. shares both values and broad interests in the world. In addition, however, Gusenbauer needs to hear the message that, when we disagree, what is necessary is bilateral dialogue and not inflammatory populism. Key objectives include the following: -- Afghanistan: We need Austrian support to achieve stability, which benefits Austria along with all its European partners. ISAF is a UN-mandated mission, and countries from throughout Europe, including neutrals, are engaged. (In contrast to Austria's four staff officers with ISAF, Finland has committed 88 soldiers in Afghanistan, while Sweden has 339. Gusenbauer and the members of his government should continue to assess what Austria can do. -- Missile Defense: We understand the fact that the Austrian government has to address its citizens' concerns. However, a great part of those concerns have arisen because of a lack of information about what missile defense means. We have been working with Gusenbauer's government to explain factually what is under discussion. We need especially to ensure that the public understands that comparisons to the Cold War are both inaccurate and inappropriate. The Secretary should reinforce these messages. SIPDIS -- Iraq: Stability in Iraq is important for all of us. Austria can and should play as large a role as possible in helping to develop the capacity of Iraqis to ensure their own security. Austrian commercial engagement in Iraq, especially in the north, can help to create the conditions for positive development. In so far as the Austrian government can encourage this engagement -- for example, by providing guidance to the country's export credit facility (the Kontrollbank) -- it should work actively to do so. -- Balkans: The U.S. greatly appreciates Austria's constructive engagement over the long term. Military, police and diplomatic engagement remains crucial, and Austria should continue to expand its role. -- Iran: Gusenbauer and his government must understand the importance of the international community's remaining united to block Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations. Commercial engagement that does not take account of political considerations disrupts our efforts. This is not the time for business as usual. The decision by Austrian energy company OMV (31% owned by the Austrian government) to sign a preliminary agreement to exploit the South Pars gas fields as a source of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) runs directly counter to the world's interests in moving the Iranian regime away from its current course. To cast the issue as Austria defending its companies against "extraterritorial" applications of American law is a tremendous mistake. Corporate decisions about strategic planning cannot drive international policy on this key issue. Arguments about energy security miss the point: there is no security in creating a dependency on one of the world's most misguided regimes. Neither does the existence of other international oil companies (Shell, Repsol, etc.) make the huge OMV deal any more palatable -- especially at this time. -- Guantanamo: Embassy views on how to approach the question of Guantanamo detainees will be provided septel. -- Visit to Washington: Gusenbauer wants to visit in Fall VIENNA 00001231 006 OF 006 2007, before or after his participation in the UNGA. He should have a realistic understanding of the prospects of a meeting with the President during this timeframe. ------------------------------------- Side-Bar Discussions with FM Plassnik ------------------------------------- 31. (C) The Secretary will have little time to engage privately with Foreign Minister Plassnik. However, it will be crucial to our future interaction with this government that she hear three clear messages: First, it is time to cool the rhetoric and discuss differences seriously, rather than through tabloid sensationalism. Second, we wish to continue our quiet and constructive work on Guantanamo (septel). Third, Afghanistan represents a critical challenge for the Euro-Atlantic security community, even neutrals. Kilner
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